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ARTICLES 
BATHROOM LAWS AS STATUS CRIMES 
Stephen Rushin* & Jenny Carroll** 
 
A growing number of American jurisdictions have considered laws that 
prohibit trans individuals from using bathroom facilities consistent with their 
gender identities.  Several scholars have criticized these so-called “bathroom 
laws” as a form of discrimination in violation of federal law.  Few scholars, 
though, have considered the criminal justice implications of these proposals. 
By analyzing dozens of proposed bathroom laws, this Article explores how 
many laws do more than stigmatize the trans community—they effectively 
criminalize it.  Some of these proposed laws would establish new categories 
of criminal offenses for trans individuals who use bathrooms consistent with 
their gender identity.  Others would transform bathroom use by trans 
individuals into an unlawful trespass.  The existing literature suggests that 
the criminal justice system is unprepared to handle this newfound 
responsibility. 
This Article concludes that, by effectively criminalizing noncriminal 
conduct so inextricably linked to the status of being trans, some proposed 
bathroom laws may violate the Eighth Amendment’s bar on cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In January of 2017, “[o]ver loud boos” from protesters outside the senate 
chamber, Texas Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick and State Senator Louis 
Kolkhorst introduced the “Women’s Privacy Act.”1  The bill would overturn 
local municipal ordinances that permit trans2 individuals to use bathroom 
facilities consistent with their gender identities and would designate 
bathrooms in public buildings “for use by people ‘according to their 
biological sex.’”3  According to Patrick, the legislation is designed not to 
harm the trans community, but to protect women and children from “abuse[,] 
attack[s], and assault[s] . . . by sexual predators.”4 
In response, LGBTQ advocates in Texas and across the country have 
sounded the alarm.  They have argued that the bill is yet another attempt to 
 
 1. See Chuck Lindell, Dan Patrick Unveils Texas Transgender Bathroom Bill, AUSTIN 
AM.-STATESMAN (Jan. 5, 2017, 3:03 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/dan-patrick-
unveils-texas-trans-bathroom-bill/aC1uoDoDysOLYW0MwVFWQO [https://perma.cc/ 
6MN6-9HSM] (explaining how the law would overturn local ordinances and leave it to each 
individual business to decide who can use which bathroom, while also limiting trans bathroom 
use in public universities, schools, and government buildings); Jason Whitely, Lt. Governor 
Rebrands Texas’ ‘Bathroom Bill,’ KHOU (Oct. 21, 2016, 5:35 AM), http://www.khou.com/ 
news/politics/lt-gov-patrick-rebrands-texas-bathroom-bill/339659250 
[https://perma.cc/5YUZ-3KBJ] (describing the Act as the “Women’s Privacy Act”).  See 
generally Privacy Protection Act, S.B. 6, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017).  
 2. This Article uses the term “trans” as shorthand for “transgender” to be more inclusive 
to the wide variety of gender identities that fall under the broader umbrella of the term 
transgender.  The term transgender itself is meant to describe a wide range of “people whose 
gender identity and/or gender expression differs from what is typically associated with the sex 
they were assigned at birth.” Glossary of Terms—Transgender, GLAAD MEDIA REFERENCE 
GUIDE, http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender [https://perma.cc/37E3-ZP44] (last 
visited September 21, 2017).  The term transgender itself is often a “contested term that is 
defined differently by medical professionals, advocates, social scientists, and . . . transgender 
people.” Rebecca L. Stotzer, Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Personnel Interactions 
with Transgender People in the United States:  A Literature Review, 19 AGGRESSION & 
VIOLENT BEHAV. 263, 264 (2014).  The term sometimes includes other subgroups of people, 
including “people with intersex conditions or some disorders of sexual development, 
dragkings/queens, cross-dressers, genderqueers, [and] gender non-conforming people,” and it 
may “include people who may or may not identify themselves as transgender but may present 
in ways that are not consistent with their gender.” Id.  This Article also uses the gender-neutral 
pronouns “they,” “their,” and “theirs” to refer to trans individuals. 
 3. Lindell, supra note 1.  
 4. Lauren McGaughy, Texas Small Businesses to Dan Patrick:  Back Off Promise to Pass 
Transgender Bathroom Bill, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Oct. 25, 2016), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/lgbt/2016/10/25/texas-small-businesses-dan-patrick-
back-promise-pass-transgender-bathroom-bill [https://perma.cc/Q3EV-L472]. 
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stigmatize the LGBTQ community in violation of federal law.5  Texas is 
hardly alone in proposing such a controversial measure.  With Patrick and 
Kolkhorst’s announcement, Texas joined a growing list of jurisdictions that 
have considered or enacted so-called “bathroom bills” since 2013,6 including 
Alabama,7 Arizona,8 Colorado,9 Florida,10 Illinois,11 Indiana,12 Kansas,13 
 
 5. Id. (noting that Chuck Smith, the CEO of LGBTQ rights group Equality Texas, called 
this measure “legislation to discriminate against LGBT Texans”).  LGBTQ advocates also 
point to the joint “Dear Colleague” letter sent out by the Obama administration’s Department 
of Justice and Department of Education, explaining that these sorts of measures constitute a 
violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. See Dear Colleague Letter on 
Transgender Students from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t 
of Educ. & Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice (May 13, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q2J-L8YP].  It is also worth noting that 
Lieutenant Governor Patrick is no stranger to this sort of controversy, as he has a long history 
of taking anti-LGBTQ positions.  For instance, after reality television star Phil Robertson of 
A&E’s Duck Dynasty compared homosexuality to bestiality, Patrick claimed that God was 
speaking through Robertson. See Eric Nicholson, Lt. Guv Hopeful Dan Patrick on “Duck 
Dynasty” Star’s Anti-Gay Rant:  “God Is Speaking to Us,” DALL. OBSERVER (Dec. 19, 2013, 
3:59 PM), http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/lt-guv-hopeful-dan-patrick-on-duck-
dynasty-stars-anti-gay-rant-god-is-speaking-to-us-7114812 [https://perma.cc/G9L2-J9HZ]. 
 6. See Joellen Kralik, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, “Bathroom Bill” 
Legislative Tracking (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-bathroom-bill-
legislative-tracking635951130.aspx [https://perma.cc/5QYC-QDPM] (providing a detailed 
list of “bathroom bills” from 2013 through January 2017). 
 7. See S. 1, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2017) (requiring bathrooms open to the public to 
be segregated by “gender” or be manned by an attendant and establishing criminal and civil 
penalties).   
 8. See S. 1045, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013) (voiding local ordinances that may 
protect trans bathroom use and preventing any state subdivision from enacting laws that may 
penalize persons who deny trans individuals access to bathrooms consistent with their gender 
identity).  
 9. See H.R. 1081, 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2015) (permitting restriction 
of access to sex-segregated locker rooms based on biological sex).  
 10. See H.R. 583, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015) (requiring individuals to use public 
restrooms based on biological sex and providing both criminal penalties and a private cause 
of action).  
 11. See H.R. 4474, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2016) (requiring sex-segregated 
bathrooms, overnight facilities, and changing rooms in school facilities and requiring students 
to use facilities based on sex “determined by an individual’s chromosomes and identified at 
birth by that individual’s anatomy”).  
 12. See S. 35, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016) (requiring single-sex 
bathroom facilities in schools and providing criminal penalties for trans individuals who use 
bathrooms inconsistent with their gender identities).  
 13. See H.R. 2737, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2016) (requiring sex-segregated bathroom 
and locker room facilities in public schools and giving students a private cause of action to 
collect up to $2500 from opposite-sex individuals they encounter in bathroom or locker room 
facilities); S. 513, 2016 Leg., Reg Sess. (Kan. 2016). 
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Kentucky,14 Louisiana,15 Michigan,16 Minnesota,17 Mississippi,18 
Missouri,19 Nevada,20 New York,21 North Carolina,22 Oklahoma,23 South 
 
 14. See S. 76, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2015) (mandating the use of sex-
segregated restrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities in public schools and providing for 
“best available accommodation” for trans students).  
 15. See S. 3895, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2016) (requesting that the State of Louisiana 
take no action to comply with the Dear Colleague letter issued by the Department of Education 
and the Department of Justice in May 2016). 
 16. See S. 993, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2016) (requiring restrooms, locker rooms, 
and shower rooms in public schools to be designated for use based on students’ biological 
sex). 
 17. See H.R. 3396, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2016) (stating that “[n]o claim of 
nontraditional identity or ‘sexual orientation’ may override another person’s right of privacy 
based on biological sex in such facilities as restrooms, locker rooms, dressing rooms, and other 
similar places, which shall remain reserved for males or females as they are biologically 
defined” and applying this mandate to employers and public schools). 
 18. See H.R. 1523, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016) (mandating that the state 
government will not take any “discriminatory action” against a person for establishing “sex-
specific standards or policies concerning employee or student dress or grooming, or 
concerning access to restrooms, spas, baths, showers, dressing rooms, locker rooms, or other 
intimate facilities or settings”).  
 19. See S. 720, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016) (establishing that in all 
settings where a “student may be in a state of undress in the presence of other students,” 
distinct areas must be designated for students to use according to their “biological sex” and 
also applying this same standard to restrooms, locker rooms, shower rooms, and other similar 
accommodations); H.R. 1339, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015) (prohibiting state 
revenues from being used to “create a gender-neutral environment in a previously gender-
divided environment” except in cases of federal or state court order); H.R. 1338, 98th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015) (requiring all public restrooms, except single-occupancy 
restrooms, to be designed as “gender-divided”). 
 20. See Assemb. 375, 78th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015) (requiring public 
schools to designate restrooms, locker rooms, showers, and areas where students may undress 
for use by students according to their biological sex, as determined at birth).  
 21. See Assemb. 10127, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2016) (establishing that restrooms 
and changing facilities at educational institutions be segregated by “biological sex” as 
identified on a person’s birth certificate).  
 22. See H.R. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016) (requiring that all 
multiple-occupancy bathrooms in public schools and public buildings be sex-segregated and 
designated for use by individuals according to their biological sex).  
 23. See S. 1619, 55th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2016) (defining “sex” as the “physical 
condition of being male or female, as identified at birth by that individual’s anatomy,” and 
providing students with a right to religious accommodation and a private right of action in 
cases where a school or district permits individuals of the opposite sex to use the same 
restrooms, changing facilities, or showers).  
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Carolina,24 South Dakota,25 Tennessee,26 Virginia,27 Washington,28 and 
Wisconsin.29  Even individual cities like Oxford, Alabama,30 have passed 
bathroom ordinances targeting trans individuals, while others, like Lufkin 
and Rockwall, Texas, have considered similar measures.31 
The issue of trans bathroom access grew in prominence after the Obama 
administration issued an administrative finding that trans students are entitled 
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197232 to use bathrooms 
consistent with their gender identities.33  Failure to provide such access to 
bathroom facilities, the Obama administration argued, constituted a form of 
 
 24. See H.R. 3012, 122d Sess., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2017) (barring local governments from 
enacting any laws that would permit trans individuals from using bathroom or changing room 
facilities inconsistent with their biological sex as stated on their birth certificate in any “public 
accommodation or a private club or other establishment”). 
 25. See H.R. 1008, 91st Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2017) (requiring “[e]very restroom, 
locker room, and shower room located in a public elementary or secondary school that is 
designated for” multiple occupancy to be used “only by students of the same biological sex” 
and providing that trans students are entitled to “reasonable accommodation[s]” like the use 
of a single-occupancy bathroom so long as it does not pose an undue hardship on the district).   
 26. See S. 2387, 109th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2016) (requiring students to use 
bathrooms and locker facilities consistent with their sex as indicated on their “original birth 
certificate”); H.R. 2414, 109th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2016).  
 27. See H.D. 1612, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017) (mandating that all government 
buildings will restrict access to bathrooms based on sex as defined by “an individual’s original 
birth certificate”; requiring parental notification by schools in cases where a minor requests 
“to be recognized or treated as the opposite sex, to use a name or pronouns inconsistent with 
the child’s sex, or to use a restroom or changing facility designated for the opposite sex”; and 
providing a civil cause of action against the government in cases where a trans person is found 
to have accessed a bathroom inconsistent with their biological sex at birth).  
 28. See H.R. 1011, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017) (altering existing 
nondiscrimination law to remove protections for trans individuals using bathrooms, locker 
rooms, showers, saunas, and other comparable facilities in accordance with their gender 
identities).  
 29. See Assemb. 469, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2015) (requiring school boards to 
designate restrooms and changing rooms in public school buildings for the exclusive use of 
only one sex as defined “by an individual’s chromosomes and identified at birth by that 
individual’s anatomy” and further establishing a process for students to receive declaratory 
relief, injunctive relief, or civil damages in cases of schools failing to follow this law).  
 30. See Zach Tyler, Oxford Council Rebukes Target Bathroom Policy with New 
Ordinance, ANNISTON STAR (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.annistonstar.com/news/oxford-
council-rebukes-target-bathroom-policy-with-new-ordinance/article_e52d109e-0c13-11e6-
b99a-135eb2794347.html [https://perma.cc/WLN3-5JRD] (explaining how the city of Oxford, 
Alabama, unanimously approved a municipal ordinance that requires individuals to use public 
restrooms that correspond to the gender listed on their birth certificates and established 
criminal and civil penalties for violation of the statute). 
 31. See Nico Lang, Could Texas Become the Next Trans Bathroom Battleground?, 
ADVOC. (May 2, 2016), http://www.advocate.com/transgender/2016/5/02/could-texas-
become-next-trans-bathroom-battleground [https://perma.cc/FQ9R-BHHX] (detailing the 
contemplated ordinances in each city); see also Ray Leszcynski, Update:  Rockwall Ordinance 
on Bathroom Use by Person’s Sex at Birth Fails in City Council, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 
29, 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2016/04/29/rockwall-enters-national-
debate-on-transgender-bathroom-use-with-monday-vote [https://perma.cc/BTA7-73AB] 
(describing how the measures in Lufkin and Rockwall ultimately failed). 
 32. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 33. See generally Lhamon & Gupta, supra note 5. 
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sex discrimination.34  In response, thirteen states filed suit against the federal 
government arguing that the Obama administration overstepped its authority 
in issuing such an administrative ruling.35  The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in one such case:  Gloucester County School Board v. G.G.36  In 
Gloucester, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals deferred to the Department 
of Education’s interpretation of Title IX on trans bathroom use.37  The 
Gloucester School Board’s decision to appeal the ruling was met with 
condemnation by civil rights groups.38  On March 6, 2017, in light of the 
Trump administration’s decision to rescind this Obama-era guidance letter, 
the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit 
for further consideration—leaving for another day the fate of trans student 
bathroom rights under Title IX.39 
It is safe to say that, in only a few short years, trans bathroom use has 
emerged as a divisive political issue.  Thus far, the literature on bathroom 
bills has focused on three major topics.  One strand of the debate has focused 
on whether these measures violate existing federal law.40  Another strand of 
research has attempted to evaluate whether bathroom bills are actually 
necessary to protect public safety as supporters contend.41  A final strand of 
research and reporting has evaluated the financial ramifications of bathroom 
bills.42 
This Article interjects into this rapidly evolving debate to explore an 
undertheorized issue related to bathroom laws—their criminal justice 
 
 34. See id. at 2 (“A School’s Title IX obligation to ensure nondiscrimination on the basis 
of sex requires schools to provide transgender students equal access to educational programs 
and activities . . . .”).  
 35. See Erik Eckholm & Alan Blinder, Federal Transgender Bathroom Access Guidelines 
Blocked by Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.nyti.ms/2k9q8qA 
[https://perma.cc/7AX3-5UGC] (clarifying that the states challenged the Obama 
administration guidance on both Title IX compliance and compliance with Title VII, which 
governs civil rights in the workplace). 
 36. 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016). 
 37. See id. at 721; Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court to Hear Transgender Bathroom 
Case, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/10/28/supreme-court-to-hear-transgender-bathroom-case/ 
[https://perma.cc/YU8D-BV25]. 
 38. See Louis Llovio, Gloucester County School Board Requests Full Appeals Court 
Review of Transgender Ruling, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Apr. 22, 2016), 
http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/article_fffed187-0d52-58db-9ee1-
1414a6414b93.html [https://perma.cc/Q77V-CN2Q] (describing the unanimous decision by 
the school board to appeal the Fourth Circuit’s decision).  
 39. See Ed Whelan, Supreme Court Vacates Fourth Circuit Transgender Ruling, NAT’L 
REV. (Mar. 6, 2017, 10:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/445519/ 
supreme-court-vacate-remand-transgender [https://perma.cc/LVK3-JT6R].  
 40. See infra Part I.  
 41. See Whelan, supra note 39 (explaining that, contrary to claims made by supporters of 
bathroom bills, there exists virtually no evidence to suggest that sexual predators have taken 
advantage of nondiscrimination ordinances to commit crimes in public restrooms).  
 42. Id. (discussing preliminary estimates of the economic impact of North Carolina House 
Bill 2—the state law that strictly limited trans bathroom use, stripped the state 
nondiscrimination ordinance, and barred localities from enacting nondiscrimination 
ordinances protecting LGBTQ residents—and discussing the estimated economic impact of a 
similar proposed bill in Texas). 
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implications.  This Article argues that some proposed measures have the 
potential to do more than stigmatize the trans community.  Bathroom laws 
could effectively criminalize the trans community.  Some of these proposed 
laws create new categories of criminal offenses for trans individuals who use 
bathrooms consistent with their gender identities.  Those proposals that do 
not establish new crime categories may nevertheless open the door for local 
police and prosecutors to classify trans bathroom use under existing criminal 
statutes such as criminal trespass.  In the process, they invite law enforcement 
officers to use the tools of the criminal justice system to enforce these 
measures. 
This criminalization of the trans community creates multiple dilemmas in 
the criminal justice arena.  First, bathroom laws saddle local law enforcement 
with the unfamiliar responsibility of identifying and policing members of the 
trans community.  The existing literature suggests that American police are 
largely untrained and poorly equipped to enforce bathroom laws.43  Few 
departments appear to have clearly articulated policies for identifying, 
booking, searching, or properly housing trans suspects—and those that do 
tend to be in jurisdictions without bathroom laws.44  Second, even in cases 
where police officers choose not to enforce bathroom laws, the mere 
existence of bathroom laws could create a sort of moral panic that may 
empower members of the public to engage in dangerous attempts at private 
enforcement.45 
Apart from their potentially discriminatory motivations and stigmatizing 
effect, these measures may expose the trans community to serious physical 
and emotional harm as unprepared law enforcement and private citizens are 
thrust into the role of policing public bathroom use.  By encouraging police 
officers and the public to police the trans community, bathroom laws increase 
the probability of police misconduct and private violence directed at an 
already disadvantaged minority group. 
Finally, this Article argues that criminalizing bathroom use, whether by 
the creation of new statutes or the use of existing ones, effectively 
criminalizes the status of being trans.  By criminalizing innocent, life-
sustaining conduct so inextricably linked to the status of being trans, some 
proposed bathroom laws may violate the Eighth Amendment’s bar on cruel 
and unusual punishment. 
In Robinson v. California,46 the Supreme Court held that while states may 
regulate behavior through criminal law, the Eighth Amendment prevents 
states from criminalizing one’s mere status.47  Six years later, in Powell v. 
Texas,48 the Court seemed to back away from Robinson, declining to hold 
that it was unconstitutional to criminalize acts linked to a particular status.49  
 
 43. See infra Part II.B. 
 44. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 45. See infra Part II.D. 
 46. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 47. See infra Part III.A. 
 48. 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
 49. Id. at 536–37. 
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Nonetheless, at least five of the Justices appeared sympathetic to the notion 
that the Constitution may impose limits on the ability of states to punish 
conduct rendered effectively involuntary by a defendant’s circumstances or 
status.50 
In the years since Robinson and Powell, scholars have debated whether any 
conduct can be so inextricably linked to a person’s status as to make the 
punishment of that conduct impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.51  
Regulation of bathroom use by trans individuals brings this debate to a head.  
When states seek to regulate the biological and necessary bodily functions of 
trans individuals through bathroom laws, this Article argues, it seeks to 
regulate their very existence.52 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I discusses the emergence of the 
modern bathroom bill.  This Part describes the Obama administration’s 
executive guidance on trans students’ use of bathrooms in public schools.  It 
then tracks the thirteen state attorneys general that have filed suit against the 
federal government to overturn President Obama’s executive guidance on 
this issue.  Next, it surveys a number of proposed state measures that would 
regulate public bathroom use by trans individuals.  Part II addresses the 
criminal justice implications of bathroom laws.  This part demonstrates how 
some bathroom proposals would explicitly or implicitly criminalize 
bathroom use by trans individuals and how many bathroom provisions would 
grant largely untrained police officers the discretion to enforce these new 
mandates, thereby increasing the chances of physical and emotional abuse of 
trans individuals.  Part III then considers avenues for future legal challenges 
to these proposed bathroom bills, focusing specifically on the theory that 
some of these measures violate the Eighth Amendment’s bar on cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
I.  THE EMERGENCE OF THE BATHROOM BILL 
Bathroom bills are a relatively recent legislative priority.  There are few 
records of state legislators proposing bathroom bills before 2013.  Since then, 
the popularity of such measures has progressively picked up steam.  What 
started as a single proposal in 2013 ballooned into nine in 2015, nineteen in 
2016, and many more in 2017.53  The emergence of the bathroom bill at the 
state level roughly coincided with a handful of cases in which trans students 
secured the right to use bathroom facilities consistent with their gender 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. See infra Part III.B.  
 52. At least some courts have found that states and localities may not criminalize innocent, 
life-sustaining conduct that is only made criminal by a person’s status.  For example, as 
discussed in Part III.B, in Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated 
after settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit found that a municipal 
ordinance that criminalized behaviors like sitting or sleeping in public effectively punished 
the status of being homeless in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Using similar logic, this 
Article illustrates how litigants could challenge criminal penalties imposed on bathroom use 
by trans individuals under the Eighth Amendment. See infra Part III.  
 53. See Kralik, supra note 6. 
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identities.54  That same year, “educators in Massachusetts, Maine and 
Portland, Oregon issued guidelines to accommodate trans students, allowing 
them to use bathrooms and play on sports teams corresponding to the gender 
with which they identify.”55 
The emergence of bathroom bills also roughly coincided with the 
proliferation of local nondiscrimination ordinances protecting trans 
individuals.56  Opponents have argued that nondiscrimination protections 
that include the trans community would open the door for “predators” to 
sneak into women’s restrooms under the guise of being trans.57 
The Obama administration’s “Dear Colleague” letter, issued jointly by the 
Department of Justice and the Department of Education, may have 
accelerated the rise of bathroom legislation.58  That administrative 
guidance,59 issued on May 13, 2016, stated that Title IX requires schools to 
treat trans students the same as “other students of the same gender identity.”60  
Specifically, the Obama administration interpreted the prohibition on 
discrimination “on the basis of sex” in “any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance” under Title IX61 to “encompass 
discrimination based on a student’s gender identity, including discrimination 
 
 54. In particular, bathroom bills seemed to coincide with a landmark case in Colorado in 
which a six-year-old trans girl won the right to use the girls’ restroom at her public school. See 
Dan Frosch, Dispute on Transgender Rights Unfolds at a Colorado School, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/us/in-colorado-a-legal-dispute-over-
transgender-rights.html [https://perma.cc/KDF9-NQUF] (describing the backstory of the case 
and other less publicized but factually similar cases); New Documentary Highlights Landmark 
Trans Bathroom Fight, WNYC (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.wnyc.org/story/ 
growing-coy-documents-landmark-transgender-bathroom-fight/ [https://perma.cc/6SXG-
D955] (describing the case as “one of the first in the U.S. to specifically address transgender 
bathroom rights” and describing Mathis’s victory as a “landmark win” that “continues to 
resonate today”). 
 55. Sabrina Rubin Erdely, About a Girl:  Coy Mathis’ Fight to Change Gender, ROLLING 
STONE (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/about-a-girl-coy-mathis-
fight-to-change-change-gender-20131028 [https://perma.cc/Z2UG-9KHY]. 
 56. According to the Human Rights Campaign, at least 225 cities have local ordinances 
that prohibit discrimination based on gender identity. See Cities and Counties with Non-
Discrimination Ordinances That Include Gender Identity, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Jan. 28, 
2016), http://www.hrc.org/resources/cities-and-counties-with-non-discrimination-
ordinances-that-include-gender [https://perma.cc/4MFM-C3Q4]. 
 57. One of the most egregious examples of this was the response to the Houston Equal 
Rights Ordinance.  While the ordinance prohibited discrimination on the basis of fifteen 
different traits, including being trans, the opposition attacked the bill’s protection of trans 
individuals.  The opponents, who went by the name Campaign for Houston, ran a highly 
transphobic ad that warned voters of how predators could use the statute to lawfully prey on 
women and girls in public restrooms. See J. Bryan Lowder, This Anti-HERO Ad Is the 
Definition of Transphobia, SLATE (Oct. 19, 2015, 4:01 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/ 
outward/2015/10/19/hero_trans_bathroom_battle_campaign_for_houston_ad_is_most_trans
phobic_yet.html [https://perma.cc/LSF4-R8MN]. 
 58. See Lhamon & Gupta, supra note 5, at 1.  
 59. It is worth mentioning that the Department of Education and the Department of Justice 
“determined that this letter [was] significant guidance” meaning that it “provides information 
and examples to inform recipients about how the Departments evaluate whether covered 
entities are complying with their legal obligations.” Id. 
 60. Id. at 2 (explaining the scope of Title IX).  
 61. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).  
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based on a student’s transgender status.”62  This finding had implications for 
a number of school-related policies.  In addition to ensuring trans students’ 
equal access to bathroom facilities consistent with their gender identities, the 
agencies advised schools that they had a responsibility to “provide a safe and 
nondiscriminatory environment for all students, including transgender 
students”;63 to treat students consistent with their gender identities regardless 
of whether they have been able to obtain identification documents reflecting 
their gender identities;64 and to permit trans students to participate in sex-
segregated activities and to access facilities consistent with their gender 
identities.65 
The Obama administration’s broad interpretation of Title IX’s prohibition 
on sex discrimination is consistent with the interpretation of statutory terms 
like “sex” and “gender” by previous federal courts.66  It is also consistent 
with the interpretation of other federal agencies during that administration.67 
 
 62. Lhamon & Gupta, supra note 5, at 1.  
 63. Id. at 2 (explaining that schools were under an obligation to respond to harassment 
that might create a hostile educational environment).  
 64. Id. at 3.  
 65. Id. at 3–4 (listing restrooms, locker rooms, athletics, single-sex classes, single-sex 
schools, social fraternities or sororities, and housing and other overnight accommodations as 
examples of areas where schools were obligated to treat trans students the same as cisgender 
students).  
 66. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) 
(“[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable 
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our 
legislators by which we are governed.  Title VII prohibits ‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . 
sex’ in the ‘terms’ or ‘conditions’ of employment.  Our holding that this includes sexual 
harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory 
requirements.” (alterations in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012))); Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (explaining that “[i]n the specific context of sex 
stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, 
or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender”); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 
1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Accordingly, discrimination against a transgender individual because 
of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it’s described as being on the basis 
of sex or gender.”); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Sex 
stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible 
discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior.”); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust 
Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000) (interpreting federal law defining “sex” to bar 
discrimination based on sex stereotyping); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–02 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (finding an actionable claim for sex discrimination under the Gender Motivated 
Violence Act when a perpetrator’s actions stemmed from the belief that a victim was a man 
but failed to act like one). 
 67. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT 
GUIDANCE LETTER NO. 37-14, UPDATE ON COMPLYING WITH NONDISCRIMINATION 
REQUIREMENTS:  DISCRIMINATION BASED ON GENDER IDENTITY, GENDER EXPRESSION AND SEX 
STEREOTYPING ARE PROHIBITED FORMS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKFORCE 
DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM (2015) (interpreting Title I of the Workforce Innovation and 
Opportunity Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity, gender expression, 
and sex stereotyping); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF JOB CORPS, JOB CORPS PROGRAM 
INSTRUCTION NOTICE NO. 14-31, ENSURING EQUAL ACCESS FOR TRANSGENDER APPLICANTS 
AND STUDENTS TO THE JOB CORPS PROGRAM 1 (2015) (“[S]taff at Job Corps centers should 
treat transgender individuals with the same respect as any other applicant or student, provide 
equal opportunity, and ensure a safe and productive environment for all Job Corps youth.”); 
Memorandum from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 15, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/188671/download [https://perma.cc/CU3W-SPXL]. 
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Conservative legislators across the country reacted angrily to the Obama 
administration’s guidance on trans bathroom access.68  At least thirteen states 
filed suit against the federal government claiming that the Obama 
administration overstepped its authority in issuing such an administrative 
ruling.69 
Not long after the Obama administration published its guidance letter, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gloucester County School Board v. 
G.G.70  There, G.G, a trans boy, sought to use the boys restroom at his high 
school.71  The local school board then passed a policy banning G.G. from 
using the boys restroom.72  G.G. filed suit against the school district alleging 
a violation of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.73  
The district court dismissed G.G.’s suit and denied a preliminary injunction 
before the Fourth Circuit reversed.74 
The Fourth Circuit ultimately deferred to the Department of Education’s 
interpretation of Title IX on trans bathroom use.75  The Gloucester School 
Board’s decision to appeal the ruling was met with condemnation by civil 
rights groups.76  On March 6, 2017, in light of the Trump administration’s 
decision to rescind this Obama-era guidance letter, the Court ultimately 
vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit for further 
consideration.77  Some may reasonably argue that the Gloucester case was 
more about deference to agency interpretations of the law than trans rights.  
Nevertheless, the case further ignited the heated national debate over the 
proper regulation of trans bathroom use. 
Regardless of the origins of the bathroom bill, it is clear that these 
potentially discriminatory proposals have grown in popularity in recent years.  
Between 2013 and 2016, at least twenty-four states considered laws that 
would restrict trans “access to multiuser restrooms, locker rooms, and other 
sex-segregated facilities.”78  At least nine of these recent proposals have 
focused specifically on limiting trans bathroom access in public schools.79  
 
 68. See Emanuella Grinberg, Feds Issue Guidance on Transgender Access to School 
Bathrooms, CNN (May 14, 2016, 3:48 AM) (quoting former North Carolina Governor Patrick 
McCrory, Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander, Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant, and Texas 
Senator Ted Cruz expressing various degrees of disagreement with and outrage over the 
Obama administration’s order), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/12/politics/transgender-
bathrooms-obama-administration/ [https://perma.cc/Q575-LLAK].  
 69. See Eckholm & Blinder, supra note 35. 
 70. 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016). 
 71. Id. at 715–16. 
 72. Id. at 714–15.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 715.  
 75. Id.; Adler, supra note 37.  
 76. See Llovio, supra note 38.  
 77. See Whelan, supra note 39.   
 78. Kralik, supra note 6. 
 79. See supra notes 7–29 (showing that Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin appear to limit their bathroom bills only to public 
school facilities). 
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The rest have included some generally applicable limitations on bathroom 
use in government buildings or public businesses.80 
The Department of Education and the Department of Justice under the 
Trump administration rescinded the Obama administration’s guidance on 
trans bathroom use in public schools,81 effectively leaving it up to individual 
states to decide whether to permit trans students to use facilities consistent 
with their gender identities.  This act has not appeared to stem the growing 
push by state legislators to regulate trans bathroom use.  In the 2017 
legislative session alone, legislators in seven states—Alabama, Kansas, 
Minnesota, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington—have 
proposed bills that would restrict trans access to bathrooms.82 
Limited scholarship on bathroom bills exists, and there is virtually no 
literature on the criminal justice implications of bathroom bills.  A handful 
of scholars have argued that existing laws protect the ability of trans 
individuals to use bathrooms consistent with their gender identities.  For 
example, advocates have argued for the use of existing disability law83 or 
employment law84 to protect trans individuals from discrimination.  Others 
have crafted constitutional and statutory objections to laws that deny trans 
individuals equal access to bathroom facilities.85 
Another group of scholars and media outlets have challenged claims that 
trans bathroom use poses a safety risk.  Some scholars, like Robin Fretwell 
Wilson, have persuasively argued that trans individuals pose no safety threat 
when using bathroom facilities consistent with their gender identities.86  
 
 80. See supra notes 7–29 (showing the wide range of laws that exist, with some explicitly 
criminalizing trans bathroom use as discussed in Part II, and others giving private individuals 
a civil right of action to enforce limitations on trans access to bathroom facilities).  For 
example, legislators in Florida, Kansas, Virginia, and Wisconsin have proposed measures that 
would give private individuals the right to pursue private causes of action in cases where a 
trans person is allowed to use a bathroom facility consistent with their gender identity. See 
supra notes 7–29. 
 81. Dear Colleague Letter from Sandra Battle, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & T.E. Wheeler II, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.employmentandlaborinsider.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/sites/328/2017/06/BLOG.Dear-Colleague-Letter-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4Q9-
MRDC] (“[T]he Department of Education and the Department of Justice have decided to 
withdraw and rescind the above-referenced guidance documents in order to further and more 
completely consider the legal issues involved.”). 
 82. See supra notes 7–29. 
 83. See generally Daniella A. Schmidt, Bathroom Bias:  Making the Case for Trans Rights 
Under Disability Law, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 155 (2013).  
 84. See generally Marvin Dunson III, Sex, Gender, and Transgender:  The Present and 
Future of Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 465 (2001).  
 85. See, e.g., Diana Elkind, The Constitutional Implications of Bathroom Access Based on 
Gender Identity:  An Examination of Recent Developments Paving the Way for the Next 
Frontier of Equal Protection, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 895 (2007) (showing how trans rights 
may be the next frontier for equal protection cases); Vincent J. Samar, The Right to Privacy 
and the Right to Use the Bathroom Consistent with One’s Gender Identity, 24 DUKE J. GENDER 
L. & POL’Y 33, 42–58 (2016) (arguing that bathroom bills constitute sex discrimination in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Title VII, and Title IX). 
 86. See generally Robin Fetwell Wilson, The Nonsense About Bathrooms:  How 
Purported Concerns over Safety Block LGBT Nondiscrimination Laws and Obscure Real 
Religious Liberty Concerns, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1373 (2017) (arguing that the 
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Reports by a number of media sources have reiterated Professor Wilson’s 
assertion.87 
A few researchers have sought to situate trans bathroom bills within the 
broader historical context of other civil rights cases.  Jennifer Levi and Daniel 
Redman have drawn historical parallels between “a little-known series of 
cases in which courts declined to enforce cross-dressing laws against 
transgender defendants” and modern laws limiting trans bathroom access.88  
Jill Weinberg has compared trans bathroom usage to other historical 
examples of segregation and discrimination.89 
Academics and advocacy groups have argued that bathroom bills 
stigmatize trans individuals in a way that may impact their health and their 
ability to participate fully in public life.90  These studies build on existing 
 
discussion over bathroom access and safety unfairly obscures more pressing and legitimate 
issues about how to best balance the need for nondiscrimination for LGBTQ persons with the 
need for religious liberty for houses of worship and other places where religious individuals 
may have good reason to expect protection for their beliefs).  
 87. See, e.g., Stevie Borrello, Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Organizations 
Debunk ‘Bathroom Predator Myth,’ ABC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/US/ 
sexual-assault-domestic-violence-organizations-debunk-bathroom-predator/story?id 
=38604019 [https://perma.cc/MR69-QM9J] (explaining how a coalition of over 200 national, 
state, and local organizations that work with sexual assault and domestic violence survivors 
argued that there has been no uptick in sexual assaults in the 200 municipalities and eighteen 
states where nondiscrimination laws protect trans bathroom use); Katy Steinmetz, Why LGBT 
Advocates Say Bathroom ‘Predator’ Argument Is a Red Herring, TIME (May 2, 2016), 
http://time.com/4314896/transgender-bathroom-bill-male-predators-argument 
[https://perma.cc/VQ6H-MQXN] (citing a lack of evidence of any such harm in the dozens of 
locations that have adopted comprehensive nondiscrimination laws and ordinances). 
 88. Jennifer Levi & Daniel Redman, The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom Equality, 34 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 133 (2010).  
 89. See Jill D. Weinberg, Trans Bathroom Usage:  A Privileging of Biology and Physical 
Difference in the Law, 18 BUFF. J. GENDER L. & SOC. POL’Y 147, 151 (2010) (comparing the 
restrictions on trans bathroom use to Jim Crow segregation laws of the South).  
 90. See, e.g., TIMOTHY WANG ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, STATE ANTI-TRANSGENDER 
BATHROOM BILLS THREATEN TRANSGENDER PEOPLE’S HEALTH AND PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC 
LIFE 1 (2016), http://fenwayhealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/COM-2485-
Transgender-Bathroom-Bill-Brief_v8-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PKA-FNTN]; Kristie L. 
Seelman, Transgender Adults’ Access to College Bathrooms and Housing and the 
Relationship to Suicidality, 63 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1378, 1379 (2016) (finding a statistical 
relationship between the denial of bathroom access and suicide attempts); Shoshana Goldberg 
& Andrew Reynolds, The North Carolina Bathroom Bill Could Trigger a Health Crisis Among 
Transgender Youth, Research Shows, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/18/the-north-carolina-bathroom-bill-could-trigger-
a-health-crisis-among-transgender-youth-research-shows [https://perma.cc/DCY3-VBLS] 
(relying in part on the results of national surveys of school climates for LGBTQ youth in high 
schools and middle schools, as well as other survey data); Max Kutner, Denying Transgender 
People Bathroom Access Is Linked to Suicide, NEWSWEEK (May 1, 2016), 
http://www.newsweek.com/transgender-bathroom-law-study-suicide-454185 
[https://perma.cc/3Y8Z-VS2W] (relying on a study from the Journal of Homosexuality that 
finds increased suicide risks for respondents who have been denied access to a bathroom 
because of their gender identity). 
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research that suggests more generally that harassment and marginalization of 
the trans community adversely affects psychological well-being.91 
Outside of academia, advocates and policymakers have argued about the 
economic cost of implementing highly controversial bathroom laws,92 as 
well as the obvious enforcement challenges of excluding individuals from 
public spaces based on their birth certificates.93 
Overall, while the existing literature explores a wide range of topics related 
to trans bathroom use,94 virtually no scholarship discusses its criminal justice 
implications.  This is a problematic oversight for several reasons.  First, not 
only have some states acted to exclude trans individuals from using 
bathrooms consistent with their gender identities, but some state legislators 
are now proposing the criminalization of such bathroom use.95  This means 
that police, jails, prisons, and criminal courts could now be thrust onto the 
frontlines of this emerging cultural battle.  Though there is a robust literature 
on the consequences of criminalization, it has not adequately considered the 
impacts of such criminalization on the trans community.  This is an important 
consideration that legislators and civil rights advocates ought to consider as 
states begin wading into this controversial subject. 
Second, attempts to criminalize trans bathroom use may open up new 
opportunities for advocates to challenge these measures using an alternative 
 
 91. See Seelman, supra note 90, at 1378–79 (citing multiple studies on how discrimination 
and marginalization of trans and gender nonconforming people may negatively impact their 
psychological well-being).  
 92. See, e.g., Kimberly Adams, The High Price of North Carolina’s Transgender 
Bathroom Bill, MARKETPLACE (May 9, 2016), https://www.marketplace.org/2016/05/09/ 
business/north-carolina-transgender-bathroom-bill-comes-cost [https://perma.cc/H92K-
KBWJ] (describing how the Charlotte Regional Visitors Authority estimated that the North 
Carolina bathroom bill cost the city more than $80 million in lost business as of May 2016); 
Corinne Jurney, North Carolina’s Bathroom Bill Flushes Away $630 Million in Lost Business, 
FORBES (NOV. 3, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/corinnejurney/2016/11/03/north-
carolinas-bathroom-bill-flushes-away-750-million-in-lost-business [https://perma.cc/AZG3-
3ZRC]; David Saleh Rauf, Study:  Transgender Bathroom Bill Could Cost Texas Economy 
$8.5 Billion Annually, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/ 
news/politics/texas_legislature/article/Study-transgender-bathroom-bill-could-cost-the-
10761390.php [https://perma.cc/7UTT-D382]. 
 93. See, e.g., Samantha Michaels, We Asked Cops How They Plan to Enforce North 
Carolina’s Bathroom Law, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/ 
politics/2016/04/north-carolina-lgbt-bathrooms-hb2-enforcement [https://perma.cc/CNV4-
V6MS] (describing the challenges that law enforcement officers face in enforcing restrictions 
on bathroom access based on designations on individuals’ birth certificates).  
 94. Although not specifically discussed in the text above, it is worth mentioning a few 
other relevant studies.  Dylan Vade has argued for a reconceptualization of legal terminology 
to be more inclusive of trans people. See Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the 
Law:  Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization of Gender That Is More Inclusive of 
Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 311 (2005).  Others have emphasized the 
need for protections for trans students. See Lindsay Hart, With Inadequate Protection Under 
the Law, Transgender Students Fight to Access Restrooms in Public Schools Based on Their 
Gender Identity, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 315, 317 (2014).  Others have wondered whether the 
discussion of bathroom rights is simply a diversion from more serious subjects on the path to 
full inclusion for trans individuals. See, e.g., Lisa Mottet, Access to Gender-Appropriate 
Bathrooms:  A Frustrating Diversion on the Path to Transgender Equality, 4 GEO. J. GENDER 
& L. 739, 744–46 (2002). 
 95. See infra Part II. 
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legal avenue:  the Eighth Amendment.  Such a constitutional challenge could 
help advocates undercut the criminal enforcement of these prohibitions on 
trans bathroom use.  Thus, the parts that follow make two separate 
contributions to the existing literature.  Part II explores the criminal justice 
implications of bathroom laws.  Part III then argues that the proposed state 
laws that criminalize trans bathroom use effectively establish status crimes 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s bar on cruel and unusual punishment. 
II.  BATHROOM LAWS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
There is a long history of limiting the application of the criminal justice 
system to conduct worthy of punishment.  As the Supreme Court suggested 
in Lawrence v. Texas,96 it may be unreasonable to utilize the blunt instrument 
of the criminal justice system “absent injury to a person or abuse of an 
institution the law protects.”97  When the law designates conduct as criminal, 
it has real consequences for both criminal defendants and actors within the 
criminal justice system.  The criminalization of conduct comes with real 
costs—enforcement costs,98 processing costs,99 incarceration costs,100 and 
other collateral consequences.101 
 
 96. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 97. Id. at 567.  As law students often learn in their first-year criminal law courses, courts 
have articulated limiting principles that prevent the punishment of otherwise seemingly 
innocent acts. See Proctor v. State, 176 P. 771, 772 (Okla. Crim. App. 1918) (preventing the 
State of Oklahoma from criminalizing the “keeping of a place”). 
 98. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 
323, 328 (2004) (advocating for the use of cost-benefit analysis to more accurately weigh the 
relative costs associated with criminal justice policy); Tom Meagher, The Costs of Crime 
Fighting, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/ 
02/12/the-cost-of-crime-fighting [https://perma.cc/5DAE-GBS4] (providing a detailed, 
historical retrospective about the costs of enforcing the federal criminal law through 
examining the budgets of the Department of Justice, the FBI, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the 
Marshals Service, the Bureau of Prisons, and the Office of Justice Programs). 
 99. See, e.g., MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:  HANDLING CASES IN 
A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1992) (arguing that, for misdemeanors and lesser felonies, the 
most significant punishment is not the minimal fines or prison sentences but rather the costs 
incurred by the defendants before the case even comes before the judge—lost wages, missed 
work, bail bondsmen commissions, fees paid to attorneys, and collateral consequences); Issa 
Kohler-Hausman, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 611 
(2014) (arguing that the New York City justice system is focused on overseeing people rather 
than handling simple adjudication).  
 100. See JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL:  A REMARKABLE COURT 
DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 17–47 (2014) (providing background on 
the costs associated with mass incarceration in the United States from the 1970s onward); 
CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST., THE PRICE OF PRISONS:  WHAT 
INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 1 (2012), https://shnny.org/uploads/Price-of-Prisons.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R3CD-ZNXG] (finding that in the forty states participating in the study, 
incarceration frequently costs taxpayers more than is reflected in corrections budgets); Brown, 
supra note 98, at 346–49 (describing the effects of incarceration on families and communities). 
 101. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364–65 (2010) (distinguishing between the 
direct consequences of criminal convictions, like incarceration, and the “collateral” 
consequences of criminal convictions, like deportation or civil action that may follow from a 
criminal conviction).  
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As discussed in Part I, the existing literature has not considered the 
criminal justice implications of laws excluding trans individuals from certain 
sex-segregated bathroom facilities.  To begin filling this gap, this Part 
examines legislative proposals from across the country related to trans 
bathroom use.  It shows how many of these bathroom bills do more than 
merely exclude trans individuals from sex-segregated spaces.   
As this Part demonstrates, many of these proposals would effectively 
criminalize the trans community.  They do this in two ways—either by 
explicitly creating a new criminal offense for trans individuals who use 
bathrooms consistent with their gender identity or by effectively 
transforming such acts into criminal trespass.  In each case, the effect is the 
same.  These proposals would criminalize members of the trans community 
for using public restrooms.  This puts local law enforcement, prison and jail 
officials, and courts on the frontlines in policing trans bathroom use.  As the 
subparts below illustrate, these actors are largely unequipped to handle this 
newfound responsibility, thus exposing the trans community to an increased 
risk of physical and emotional harm. 
A.  Criminalizing the Trans Community: 
Bathroom Use as a Crime and as a Trespass 
This Part first discusses laws that treat bathroom use as a crime.  It then 
analyzes laws treating bathroom use as a trespass. 
The most direct way that proposed bathroom laws criminalize the trans 
community is by explicitly establishing a new criminal offense category for 
trans individuals who use bathrooms consistent with their gender identities.  
For example, Indiana Senate Bill No. 35 would make it a Class A 
misdemeanor for a person who is of the “physical condition of being [one 
‘biological gender’], as determined by an individual’s chromosomes and 
identified at birth by the individual’s anatomy” to use a public restroom 
facility designed for the other “biological gender.”102  This broad definition 
of so-called “biological gender” is even more dangerous than many proposals 
from other states.  For one thing, this definition draws no distinction between 
individuals who identify as trans, those who have begun to transition, those 
who have undergone sex reassignment procedures, and those who have had 
their birth certificate corrected.  Under this definition, all members of the 
trans community would be forced to use public facilities matching their sex 
assigned at birth or face serious criminal penalties.  Class A misdemeanors 
are the highest misdemeanor offense category in Indiana and can result in up 
to one year of incarceration and up to a $5000 fine.103 
 
 102. S. 35, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016).  This Article uses the 
terminology “biological gender” because this is the language used by the Indiana bill.  This 
does not reflect any judgment about the correctness of this terminology.  This terminology is 
out of step with the preferred language recommended by those in the trans community, experts, 
and activists. See, e.g., Transgender Terminology, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 
(Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.transequality.org/issues/resources/transgender-terminology 
[https://perma.cc/PC28-8YL3]. 
 103. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-3-2 (West 2016). 
2017] BATHROOM LAWS AS STATUS CRIMES 17 
Similarly, Florida House Bill 583 states that “[a] person who knowingly 
and willfully enters a single-sex public facility designated for or restricted to 
persons of the other sex commits a misdemeanor of the second degree.”104  
Under Florida law, a second-degree misdemeanor results in a “definite term 
of imprisonment not exceeding 60 days”105 and up to a $500 fine.106 
Other states do not clearly delineate a category of criminal offense for 
violations of their bathroom proposals but do explicitly encourage law 
enforcement to engage in policing.  For example, Senate Bill 1 in Alabama 
states that “[e]nforcement of this act shall be authorized by any state or local 
law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the person or entity 
providing rest rooms, bathrooms, or changing facilities to the public.”107 
While some state legislators have proposed the creation of new criminal 
offense categories for trans bathroom use, most existing proposals would 
merely establish prohibitions on trans bathroom access without attaching any 
clear criminal penalty.  This has led some commentators to conclude that, if 
such a law were to pass, a trans person could not be arrested for using a 
bathroom facility consistent with their gender identity.108  Unfortunately, this 
conclusion is not entirely accurate.  By announcing prohibitions regarding 
who can lawfully access public, sex-segregated bathroom facilities, these 
bathroom laws open the door for police to arrest trans individuals for criminal 
trespass. 
Generally, states define criminal trespass as the unlawful or unlicensed 
entry or presence in a space.109  It is more difficult to charge a person with 
trespassing on public property.  In such cases, 
when property is open to the public at the time of an alleged trespass, the 
state has the burden of proving that a lawful order excluding the defendant 
from the premises [was] issued, that the order was communicated to the 
defendant by a person with authority to make the order, and that the 
defendant defied the order.110 
 
 104. H.R. 583, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015). 
 105. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 (West 2016). 
 106. Id. § 775.083 (stating the fine shall not exceed “$500, when the conviction is of a 
misdemeanor of the second degree or a noncriminal violation”).  
 107. S. 1, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2017). 
 108. See Michaels, supra note 93 (stating, in reference to the North Carolina law, that 
“[b]ecause it’s a civil law, using the wrong bathroom wouldn’t be considered a criminal 
violation in itself”). 
 109. See 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 190 (2017).  Like all criminal offenses, each element 
of trespass must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.  Some states limit the application 
of criminal trespass to situations where a defendant has remained in a space after being ordered 
to leave by the owner of the property or by another authorized person. See State v. Delgado, 
562 A.2d 539, 544 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).  The court found that the requisite Connecticut 
statute required a showing that “(1) that the defendant, knowing that he was not privileged or 
licensed to do so, entered or remained in a building; and (2) that the defendant committed that 
act after an order to leave or not to enter had been personally communicated to him by the 
owner or other authorized person.” Id. (quoting State v. LoSacco, 529 A.2d 1348, 1350 
(1987)). 
 110. 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 191 (2017). 
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These sorts of limitations on the use of trespass against individuals 
occupying public spaces make sense.  When a particular space is open to the 
public at the time of an alleged trespass, we often assume that a person has a 
license or privilege to be present without penalty.111  In such cases, it is 
common for the state to have a burden of showing that it communicated a 
lawful order excluding the defendant from the premises, which the defendant 
defied.112  Some states have limited the use of trespass in public spaces to 
cases where the prosecutor can demonstrate the “additional fact” that the 
defendant lacked a legal right to remain thereby protecting against capricious 
or arbitrary enforcement.113  The posting of signs, the announcement of 
regulations, or the use of fences and barricades can be sufficient to 
demonstrate this “additional fact.”114 
The majority of bathroom law proposals would seemingly open the door 
for police officers to arrest some trans individuals for criminal trespass for 
using bathroom facilities consistent with their gender identities.  Before the 
consideration of modern bathroom bills, state courts had already held that it 
may constitute unlawful trespass for a person who identifies as a man to enter 
a restroom facility designated exclusively for those who identify as 
women.115  In such cases, courts have held that a state may permissibly 
exclude individuals from public spaces and use criminal trespass to enforce 
such exclusion where visible signs designated a bathroom facility for the 
 
 111. See, e.g., People v. Leonard, 465 N.E.2d 831, 834 (N.Y. 1984) (explaining that 
“[w]hen the property is ‘open to the public’ at the time of the alleged trespass . . . the accused 
is presumed to have a license and privilege to be present” (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.00 
(McKinney 2017))). 
 112. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 739 P.2d 781, 783 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (“The jury must 
find that the premises were open to the public, that Johnson was personally ordered to leave 
the premises, that the person who gave the order was authorized by the owner of the premises 
to give the order, and that the order was legally effective to terminate Johnson’s license or 
privilege to utilize the premises.”); People v. Brown, 254 N.E.2d 755, 757 (N.Y. 1969) 
(concluding that when someone “lawfully entered the premises, a conviction could be had [for 
trespass] only if the prosecution established that (1) a lawful order not to remain was 
personally communicated to the defendant and (2) that he defied such a lawful order”).  
 113. See, e.g., Hemmati v. United States, 564 A.2d 739, 745 (D.C. 1989) (“One who 
remains present in a restricted area with a bona fide belief of his legal authority to remain there 
is not guilty of unlawful entry.”); O’Brien v. United States, 444 A.2d 946, 948 (D.C. 1982) 
(noting that the government must show “some additional specific factor establishing the 
[individual’s] lack of a legal right to remain” to prove unlawful entry onto public property).  
 114. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 563 A.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C. 1989); Carson v. United 
States, 419 A.2d 996, 998 (D.C. 1980) (holding that factors that can demonstrate a person’s 
lack of a legal right to remain include “posted regulations, signs[,] or fences and barricades 
regulating the public’s use of government property”). 
 115. See Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-Sexual Assault, Domestic Violence, and Gender-
Based Violence Organizations in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Seeking Reversal at 8–9, 
Carcaño v. McCrory, No. 16-1989 (4th Cir. Oct. 25, 2016), 2016 WL 6312116 (“Charlotte’s 
nondiscrimination ordinance would have allowed transgender men to use men’s facilities and 
transgender women to use women’s facilities.  It would have remained illegal for men to 
trespass in women’s restrooms, as well as to engage in a range of conduct in them.”). 
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exclusive use of one gender.116  For example, in In re S.M.S.,117 the Court of 
Appeals of North Carolina heard a challenge by a juvenile defendant to a 
second-degree criminal trespass conviction.118  There, a school coach caught 
the defendant going into the girls’ locker room.  While the Court of Appeals 
ultimately found that the school was more than capable of dealing with this 
incident without the assistance of the criminal justice system, it did conclude 
that a “sign marked ‘Girl’s Locker Room’ was reasonably likely to give 
respondent notice that he was not authorized to go into the girls’ locker room, 
pursuant to” the North Carolina statute.119 
Similarly, in Commissioner v. White,120 a case before the Superior Court 
of Pennsylvania, a man was found guilty at trial for criminal trespass for 
entering a “ladies’ room” inside the Society Hill Club in Philadelphia.121  The 
defendant challenged his conviction for criminal trespass, arguing that the 
ladies’ room was not a “separately secured or occupied portion” of a building 
as required under the Pennsylvania statute.122  In rejecting the defendant’s 
argument, the court concluded that the ladies’ room was “reserved for the 
exclusive use of only a subset of the total population authorized to use the 
larger structure.”123  Such a holding should hardly be surprising.  As one 
court remarked, before trans bathroom use emerged as a divisive national 
issue, “the application of the . . . trespass laws to sex-segregated bathrooms 
and showers [was] straightforward and uncontroversial.”124 
Without the presence of a bathroom law on the books, trans individuals 
may have a reasonable argument that existing signage does not clearly 
communicate which bathroom they ought to use.  In such cases, it may prove 
challenging for a prosecutor to use existing trespass statutes to penalize a 
trans person for using a bathroom consistent with their gender identity.  After 
all, a trans person could simply argue that signage designating gender-
segregated bathrooms does not clarify how the state defines each gender 
category. 
But by passing a law that explicitly clarifies which public bathroom 
facilities a person may lawfully enter, a prosecutor may be able to argue that 
the state has provided trans individuals with notice.  Judge Thomas D. 
Schroeder of the Middle District of North Carolina has agreed with this 
assessment.  After North Carolina passed a bill limiting trans individuals’ 
access to public bathroom facilities consistent with their gender identities, a 
group of civil liberties organizations, trans students, and state employees 
 
 116. See, e.g., In re S.M.S., 675 S.E.2d 44, 46 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that “[t]he 
sign marked ‘Girl’s Locker Room’ was reasonably likely to give respondent notice that he was 
not authorized to go into the girls’ locker room” under the statute); Comm’r v. White, 538 
A.2d 887, 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (“We hold that appellant’s entry into the ladies’ room 
violated § 3503(a)(1)(i), and therefore affirm his conviction of felonious criminal trespass.”). 
 117. 675 S.E.2d 44 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). 
 118. Id. at 44. 
 119. Id. at 46.  
 120. 538 A.2d 887, 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). 
 121. Id. at 888. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 889. 
 124. Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 629 (M.D.N.C. 2016). 
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brought suit against the governor and the University of North Carolina 
seeking to enjoin the law.125  While Judge Schroeder’s memorandum 
opinion, order, and preliminary injunction covered significant ground, one 
particular piece of his analysis is worth reproducing here.  Judge Schroeder 
acknowledged that limitations on access to public restroom facilities had 
previously been enforced through “voluntary compliance, social mores, and 
when necessary criminal trespassing law.”126 
While neither party was able to point to a criminal trespass case involving 
a trans individual in North Carolina, this was likely because “individuals who 
dress and otherwise present themselves in accordance with their gender 
identity have generally been accommodated” at least on a “case-by-case 
basis.”127  By changing state law to explicitly bar trans individuals from 
accessing bathrooms consistent with their gender identities, the court 
concluded that the North Carolina law now means that “any person who uses 
a covered facility that does not align with his or her birth certificate commits 
a misdemeanor trespass.”128 
Thus, this is not an imagined or hypothetical concern.  By passing a 
prohibition on trans bathroom access in public, North Carolina has opened 
up the trans community to criminal enforcement under existing trespass 
statutes.  Furthermore, nothing about the North Carolina trespass statute 
makes it particularly unique.  Should other states follow suit and provide 
limitations on trans access to public restrooms consistent with their gender 
identities, these states may similarly transform harmless public bathroom use 
by trans individuals into criminal trespass. 
B.  Police Enforcement 
Bathroom law proposals that explicitly or effectively criminalize bathroom 
use by trans individuals would place police officers on the frontlines of 
enforcing these proposed criminal prohibitions.  This Part first discusses the 
long and well-documented history of police officers in the United States 
mistreating the trans community.129  Modern evidence suggests that 
transphobic cultures exist in many American police departments.130  This 
may be, in part, because it appears that police rarely receive training in 
dealing with the trans community.  This Part then identifies inherent 
challenges to bathroom law enforcement.  Taken together, lack of training, 
the history of mistreatment, and evidence of a transphobic culture suggest 
that police enforcement of bathroom laws could increase the likelihood of 
misconduct directed at an already disadvantaged minority group. 
 
 125. See id. at 622–25.  
 126. Id. at 623.  
 127. Id. at 624. 
 128. Id. at 628.  The court found that multiple parties to the suit appeared to be in agreement 
that the North Carolina bathroom law could be enforced using trespass statutes. See id. 
 129. See Noah Remick, Activists Say Police Abuse of Transgender People Persists Despite 
Reforms, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/nyregion/ 
activists-say-police-abuse-of-transgender-people-persists-despite-reforms.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/VB3X-W9EQ].  
 130. See id.  
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1.  Existing Evidence on Treatment of Trans Community by 
American Law Enforcement 
The existing literature suggests that trans individuals already experience 
an unusually high level of contact with law enforcement, even without 
bathroom laws.131  At least thirteen studies since 2003 have surveyed trans 
individuals about their experience with law enforcement abuse outside of a 
custodial setting.132  These studies reveal a few important trends.  First, there 
is widespread agreement within the existing literature that trans individuals 
are reluctant to go to the police when they become victims of crimes.  For 
example, a 2007 report by Jessica Xavier, Julie Honnold, and Judith Bradford 
found that 83 percent of trans individuals victimized by sexual assault and 70 
percent of those victimized by physical assault chose not to go to police.133  
That report relied on a survey of 350 individuals identified through trans 
support groups and informal peer networks.134  This roughly mirrors other 
studies on this same subject.  A 2005 survey of 265 individuals primarily in 
Wisconsin found that only 9 percent of trans victims of sexual assault 
reported the crime to the police.135  A 2001 survey by A. R. Sousa of forty-
four trans individuals in San Francisco, recruited through agencies serving 
the trans community, found that among trans individuals that had been 
victims of criminal acts, only 25 percent reported the incidents to police.136  
A 1997 study by Emilia L. Lombardi and others of 402 trans individuals 
across the country found that over 41 percent of victims of harassment or 
violence never went to the police.137  Of course, these surveys use a wide 
range of sampling methodologies—some more sophisticated than others.  
Some of these studies are also geographically limited, meaning that it is 
difficult to reach any generalizable conclusions from their results alone.  But, 
taken together, the existing body of work suggests that trans individuals are 
likely more reluctant than their cisgender counterparts to turn to the criminal 
justice system when they have been victims of crimes. 
 
 131. A literature review by Rebecca L. Stotzer in 2014 provides an excellent summary of 
many of the existing studies. See Stotzer, supra note 2, at 272. 
 132. Id. at 271 (showing a list of all thirteen studies and their respective findings).  
Sampling strategies for these surveys varies widely.  Some use fairly reliable sampling 
strategies, while others rely on snowball sampling or samples of convenience.  So it is not wise 
to rely on any one study as representative of the diverse lived experiences of trans individuals 
from all across the United States. Id. at 265–70 (describing the sample methodologies used in 
the existing studies).  
 133. JESSICA XAVIER ET AL., THE HEALTH, HEALTH-RELATED NEEDS, AND LIFECOURSE 
EXPERIENCES OF TRANSGENDER VIRGINIANS 22 (Jan. 2007), http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/ 
content/uploads/sites/10/2016/01/THISFINALREPORTVol1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KNC-
HYJW]. 
 134. Id. at 10–11.  
 135. Stotzer, supra note 2, at 268, 274 (showing the number of respondents and describing 
the study’s findings thereafter).  
 136. See A. R. Sousa, A Victimization Study of Transgendered Individuals in San 
Francisco, California 44 (Dec. 2001) (unpublished M.S. thesis), 
http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_theses/2245 [https://perma.cc/5WEY-GV8E]. 
 137. See generally Emilia L. Lombard et al., Gender Violence:  Transgender Experiences 
with Violence and Discrimination, 42 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 89, 96 (2001) (providing an 
overview of the study and its results). 
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In examining the existing literature, Rebecca Stotzer found that few studies 
examined the reasons why trans individuals seem reluctant to seek police 
assistance after being victimized.  The few studies that did examine this 
question in more depth concluded that trans people often fear discrimination 
or ridicule from law enforcement or have been discouraged from contacting 
police because of previous negative experiences.138 
Second, and relatedly, previous studies have found that when trans 
individuals do interact with police, they face a heightened risk of 
discrimination and abuse.  Some of the best data on this subject come from a 
survey of 6450 trans and gender nonconforming individuals from all fifty 
U.S. states, organized by Jaime M. Grant and others.139  That study found 
significant evidence of police mistreatment.  Twenty-nine percent of all trans 
individuals and 46 percent of gender nonconforming individuals in the 
sample reported police officers treated them with disrespect.140  Six percent 
reported being physically assaulted by police, and 2 percent reported being 
sexually assaulted by police.141  Further, 22 percent of all trans individuals 
and 29 percent of gender nonconforming individuals in the survey reported 
being harassed by police.142  All of this may explain why “[a]lmost half of 
the respondents reported being uncomfortable seeking police assistance.”143  
Another survey of 2376 individuals conducted by Lambda Legal found that 
nearly one-third of trans and gender nonconforming individuals faced hostile 
interactions with police, nearly one-quarter of trans individuals reported 
being verbally assaulted by police, and a smaller but significant percentage 
reported being physically assaulted or sexually harassed.144 
Unfortunately, the existing literature does not definitively identify why 
trans individuals appear particularly likely to become victims of police abuse.  
Nevertheless, there may be reason to believe that the mistreatment of the trans 
community by police stems in part from a transphobic culture common 
within U.S. law enforcement.  Policing scholars agree that officer misconduct 
is often rooted in a department’s organizational culture.145  Research by 
 
 138. See Stotzer, supra note 2, at 275 (mentioning that trans individuals often worry that 
police will not take their claims seriously). 
 139. See JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN:  A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2, 158–62 (2011), 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8KA8-TSU3]. 
 140. See id. at 159 (finding that 37 percent of female-to-male trans individuals report 
disrespect while 25 percent of male-to-female trans individuals report disrespect).  
 141. Id. at 160.  The report also notes that the likelihood of physical or sexual assault 
differed based on the race of the victim. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 162 (showing the breakdown of the levels of comfort and discomfort in seeking 
help from the police).  
 144. LAMBDA LEGAL, PROTECTED AND SERVED? 4, 11 (2015) (showing that 32 percent of 
respondents reported hostile attitudes from police, 22 percent reported being verbally 
assaulted, 4 percent reported being physically assaulted, and 8 percent reported being sexually 
harassed), https://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/ps_ 
executive-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7KT-LP8X]. 
 145. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 515–25 (2004) (theorizing on the organizational roots of police 
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organizational theorists has also found that socialization, on-the-job training, 
and internal systems of rewards or penalties can also contribute to 
misconduct.146  The link between organizational culture and misconduct is 
important in the case of trans bathroom laws because police have a long 
history of mistreating the trans community.147 
While these studies do not suggest that police officers are incapable of 
policing the trans community,148 it should give reasonable legislators some 
hesitation in establishing new statutes that ensure regular (and likely hostile) 
interactions between the trans community and law enforcement.  Indeed, 
many law enforcement officers appear to lack adequate training in how to 
deal with the trans community.149  This is important because, if a police 
 
misconduct); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 
99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1417 (2015) (“[S]cholars have increasingly tied misconduct within a 
police department to underlying trends in organizational culture.”); Kami Chavis Simmons, 
The Politics of Policing:  Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local 
Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 505–06 (2008) (discussing 
the organizational roots of police misconduct).  Perhaps one of the most prominent examples 
of this phenomenon is the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).  There, investigators 
connected the beating of Rodney King, in part, to “a diseased organizational culture within the 
LAPD that condoned violence, tolerated racism, and failed to respond to wrongdoing.” 
Rushin, supra note 45, at 1345. 
 146. See Diane Vaughan, The Dark Side of Organizations:  Mistake, Misconduct, and 
Disaster, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 271, 290 (1999) (describing how the “willingness [of an 
organizational member] to use illegitimate means on the organization’s behalf is sealed by a 
reinforcing system of rewards and punishments”).  
 147. See CHRISTY MALLORY, AMIRA HASENBUSH & BRAD SEARS, DISCRIMINATION AND 
HARASSMENT BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN THE LGBT COMMUNITY 6 (2015), 
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Discrimination-and-
Harassment-in-Law-Enforcement-March-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NX5-PX8G] (stating 
that “[f]or decades, the LGBT community, and particularly LGBT people of color, youth, and 
transgender and gender nonconforming members of the LGBT community, has been subjected 
to profiling, entrapment, discrimination, harassment, and violence by law enforcement” and 
discussing how the Stonewall raids specifically targeted trans and gender nonconforming 
individuals); Michelangelo Signorile, Escalating Police Violence and Transgender People, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2011, 9:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelangelo-
signorile/escalating-police-violenc_b_1131343.html [https://perma.cc/KQR4-5FQF] 
(describing numerous accounts of police mistreatment of trans individuals).  See generally 
Kristina B. Wolff & Carrie L. Cokely, “To Protect and to Serve?”:  An Exploration of Police 
Conduct in Relation to the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Community, 11 
SEXUALITY & CULTURE 1 (2007) (using content analysis of incident reports in Minnesota to 
examine the prevalence of negative interactions between police and the LGBT community); 
Jordan Blair Woods et al., Latina Transgender Women’s Interactions with Law Enforcement 
in Los Angeles County, 7 POLICING 379 (2013) (conducting semistructured interviews with 
low-income Latina transgender women recruited from a community-based organization to 
show that they are common victims of verbal harassment, physical assault, and sexual assault 
at the hands of local law enforcement).  
 148. Indeed, encouraging evidence shows that the ranks of many police departments have 
diversified in recent years. See David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 577 (2008) (“More importantly, there is a growing body of evidence 
that the new diversity in the ranks is having a profound effect on the occupational culture of 
policing itself.  There is more division and disagreement in police forces today, more internal 
debate, more factionalism, more mutual suspicion, more discord.”). 
 149. Abundant experiential evidence supports this notion. See, e.g., supra note 147 and 
accompanying text.  However, the number of police departments providing training on trans 
issues remains unclear.  Roughly 18,000 law enforcement departments exist in the United 
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department “implicitly condone[s] wrongdoing through the use of ‘lax 
supervision and inadequate investigation’ techniques,” then that department 
is “more likely to see ongoing misconduct than departments that aggressively 
enforce internal regulations.”150  Local law enforcement appears to have only 
begun to train officers in how to deal with trans suspects.  Not until 2014 did 
the Department of Justice make trans cultural competency training available 
to local law enforcement through its Community Relations Service.151  The 
FBI did not alter its Training Manual and Hate Crime Statistics Form to 
include information on trans individuals until 2012.152  Furthermore, even 
though the Department of Justice has agreed to settlements related to police 
misconduct153 to overhaul local police practices in at least thirty-one police 
departments, it has only recently begun to include antitrans-bias training in 
these agreements.154  More research is needed to evaluate the extent to which 
local police departments provide adequate training related to the trans 
community.  The existing evidence, though, is discouraging. 
2.  Inherent Enforcement Challenges 
The evidence from the previous subpart illustrates that the law 
enforcement community is largely untrained and ill-equipped to enforce 
bathroom laws.  Compounding this lack of preparedness are the fundamental 
enforcement challenges involved in identifying individuals violating 
bathroom laws.  The majority of the proposed statutes require individuals to 
use bathroom facilities consistent with an individual’s biological “sex.”155  
These statutes vary somewhat in how they define a person’s sex.  Most define 
sex at the chromosomal level,156 by the sex-designation given to a person at 
 
States. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
csllea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL7D-YPFL].  The federal government keeps only limited 
records on the conduct of these thousands of decentralized state and local agencies. See 
Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 118 (2016) 
(“Although the federal government keeps records on everything from ‘how many people were 
victims of unprovoked shark attacks . . . to the number of hogs and pigs living on farms in the 
[United States], there is no reliable data on how many people are shot by police officers each 
year.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Wesley Lowery, How Many Police Shootings a Year? 
No One Knows, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2014/09/08/how-many-police-shootings-a-year-no-one-knows/?utm_term=.3d29 
55c7242f [https://perma.cc/HYE3-5AU9])). 
 150. Rushin, supra note 149 (quoting Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department 
of Justice:  An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 816 (1999)). 
 151. HARPER JEAN TOBIN ET AL., A BLUEPRINT FOR EQUALITY:  A FEDERAL AGENDA FOR 
TRANS PEOPLE 25 (2015).  
 152. See id. at 26.  
 153. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012). 
 154. See TOBIN ET AL., supra note 151, at 25 (citing the New Orleans consent decree as the 
first settlement of its kind “to address anti-trans bias in policing”).  Notably, the President’s 
task force on 21st Century Policing also recommended that police departments establish 
policies to reduce bias against the LGBTQ community. Id. 
 155. See supra notes 7–29 and accompanying text.  
 156. See, e.g., H.R. 4474, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2016) (describing sex in part 
as based on “an individual’s chromosomes”).  
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birth as memorialized on their birth certificate,157 or by a person’s sexual 
anatomy.158 
The enforcement challenges of such an approach are obvious.  These 
proposed laws put police in the unenviable position of guessing the 
chromosomal makeup or the sexual anatomy of private individuals entering 
a public bathroom.  Under Terry v. Ohio,159 a police officer would need 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a limited, investigatory stop against a 
civilian.160  To execute an arrest in such a situation, a police officer would 
need to have probable cause that a person was using a bathroom facility 
inconsistent with their chromosomal, anatomical, or otherwise designated 
sex.161  In cases where a trans individual is living their life and presenting in 
a manner consistent with their gender identity, it may prove practically 
impossible for a police officer to meet such an evidentiary standard—
particularly given that no state could reasonably expect all persons to carry 
with them a copy of original birth certificate to present on demand to a 
suspicious law enforcement officer.  It could also create a high risk of false 
positives.162 
C.  Incarceration 
Once police are given a license to enforce violations of bathroom laws as 
crimes, the number of trans individuals who may be taken into state custody 
would likely increase, at least temporarily.  Evidence suggests that, once 
incarcerated, trans individuals face a substantially higher risk of harassment 
and physical injury than members of other groups.163  At least eight empirical 
studies since 2003 have examined the lived experience of trans individuals in 
custodial settings.164  These studies indicate that trans individuals face a 
heightened risk of discrimination, verbal abuse, sexual harassment, physical 
assault, sexual assault, and violence.165  Thirty-eight percent of trans 
individuals and 29 percent of gender nonconforming individuals in the Grant 
survey reported being harassed by other inmates at jail or prison facilities, 
 
 157. See, e.g., Assemb. 10127, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2016) (using a person’s birth 
certificate as a distinguishing factor for sex-segregated bathrooms).  
 158. See, e.g., Assemb. 469, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2015) (using a person’s 
“anatomy” as a means of distinguishing between male and female individuals for sex-
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 159. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
 160. Id. at 9 
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degree of power that they exercise over their lives”).  
 163. See Editorial, Prisons and Jails Put Transgender Inmates at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
9, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2jXQz2h [https://perma.cc/6WLK-CXG5]. 
 164. See Stotzer, supra note 2, at 273–74. 
 165. Id. 
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while an even higher percentage reported harassment by staff.166  Nineteen 
percent of trans individuals and 4 percent of gender nonconforming 
individuals also reported being physically assaulted by staff or inmates, while 
a comparable number reported being sexually assaulted.167  A substantial 
portion of trans individuals also reported a denial of healthcare while 
incarcerated.168 
In a study of the California correctional system, Valerie Jenness found that 
59 percent of trans inmates in state custody reported being sexually 
assaulted—a rate thirteen times higher than a random sample of inmates.169  
A 2011 study by Pascal Emmer, Adrian Lowe, and R. Barrett Marshall 
concluded that nearly half of trans individuals “had been laughed at during 
the search process,” had been “put on display,” or had been “called 
names.”170  Around 12 percent of respondents in that survey also reported 
being physically injured on purpose.171  These results are similar to those in 
a 2012 survey by Frank Galvan and Mohsen Bazargan, which found that a 
significant proportion of Latina trans women taken into state custody felt they 
were unfairly treated.172 
D.  Private Enforcement 
The effective criminalization of trans bathroom use may also embolden 
civilians to engage in dangerous attempts at private enforcement of bathroom 
laws.  Take, for example, the experience of Ebony Belcher, a trans woman 
who attempted to use a bathroom inside of a grocery store in Washington, 
D.C.—a  district that has not even considered a ban on trans bathroom use.173  
 
 166. GRANT ET AL., supra note 139, at 166 (breaking down these numbers in the figure 
entitled “Harassment in Jail/Prison by Gender”). 
 167. Id. at 168 (noting that 16 percent of trans individuals and 8 percent of gender 
nonconforming individuals reported being sexually assaulted by either staff or other inmates).  
 168. See id. at 169 (showing that 14 percent of trans individuals reported a denial of 
healthcare, while 20 percent reported denial of hormones).  
 169. See Valerie Jenness et al., Violence in California Correctional Facilities:  An 
Empirical Examination of Sexual Assault, U.C. IRVINE CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED 
CORRECTIONS (May 16, 2007), http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/files/2013/06/PREA_ 
Presentation_PREA_Report_UCI_Jenness_et_al.pdf [https://perma.cc/CHP6-QMJQ].  The 
sample of trans individuals studied, however, was fairly small, meaning that this study should 
not be viewed as representative for all incarcerated trans individuals. See id. 
 170. Stotzer, supra note 2, at 273 (quoting PASCAL EMMER ET AL., HEARTS ON A WIRE 
COLLECTIVE, THIS IS A PRISON, GLITTER IS NOT ALLOWED:  EXPERIENCES OF TRANS AND 
GENDER VARIANT PEOPLE IN PENNSYLVANIA’S PRISON SYSTEMS 30 (2011), 
http://socialproblems.voices.wooster.edu/files/2011/08/heartsonawire.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q795-6T2S]). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See id. (citing FRANK H. GALVAN & MOHSEN BAZARGAN, BIENESTAR HUMAN SERVS., 
INTERACTIONS OF LATINA TRANSGENDER WOMEN WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT (Apr. 2012), 
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Galvan-Bazargan-Interactions-
April-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJB7-TU7T]). 
 173. See Jackie Bensen, Guard Charged with Assault After Confronting Transgender 
Woman Using Women’s Restroom, Police Say, NBC WASH. (May 18, 2016), 
http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Guard-Charged-with-Assault-After-Confronting-
Transgender-Woman-Using-Womens-Restroom-380010941.html [https://perma.cc/W8PR-
UPDR]. 
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Ms. Belcher’s decision to use a bathroom facility consistent with her gender 
identity roused the ire of a private security guard at the store.174  When Ms. 
Belcher entered the women’s restroom, the security guard followed her inside 
before allegedly calling Ms. Belcher derogatory names, insisting that “[y]ou 
guys cannot keep coming in here and using our women’s restroom,” and 
ultimately using physical force to push Ms. Belcher—who suffers from 
Parkinson’s Disease—out of the store.175 
Ms. Belcher’s experience mirrors a number of recent incidents where 
private citizens engaged in trans policing to exclude trans individuals from 
using the restroom of their choice.  In Hercules, California, three high school 
boys attacked a fifteen-year-old trans boy while he used the boys’ restroom 
at his school.176  Two women viciously beat and spit on Chrissy Lee Polis, a 
trans woman, when she stopped to use a restroom at a McDonald’s in 
Rosedale, Maryland.177  In Danbury, Connecticut, a woman mistakenly 
thought another cisgender woman was trans and harassed her while she was 
washing her hands in a Wal-Mart bathroom.178  While boycotting Target for 
permitting trans individuals to use restrooms consistent with their gender 
identities, Anita Staver, president of the evangelical Christian legal 
organization Liberty Counsel, tweeted that she would be “taking a Glock .45 
to the ladies room” because the weapon “identifies as [her] bodyguard.”179  
And a sheriff candidate in Denton County, Texas, threatened physical 
violence toward trans women who used restrooms consistent with their 
gender identities.180 
 
 174. See id. 
 175. Id.  It is worth noting that Washington, D.C. police ultimately arrested the security 
guard. Id. 
 176. Ari Bloomekatz, Transgender Student Allegedly Attacked by Boys in School 
Bathroom, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/04/local/la-me-ln-
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 178. See Matt DeRienzo, Woman Mistaken for Trans Harassed in Walmart Bathroom, 
DANBURY NEWS TIMES (May 16, 2016), http://www.newstimes.com/local/article/Woman-
mistaken-for-trans-harassed-in-7471666.php [https://perma.cc/5MNQ-N756] (noting that the 
harasser told the other cisgender woman that she was “disgusting” and that she did not “belong 
here”). 
 179. Curtis M. Wong, Liberty Counsel President Says She’ll Bring a Gun into Target’s 
Bathroom, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/anita-
staver-target-restroom_us_571fbaf3e4b0b49df6a957ed [https://perma.cc/F9K8-4SYX]. 
 180. See Christian McPhate, Denton County GOP Sheriff Candidate Tracy Murphree Calls 
for Violence Against Trans People Needing to Pee, DALL. OBSERVER (Apr. 22, 2016), 
http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/denton-county-gop-sheriff-candidate-tracy-murphree-
calls-for-violence-against-transgender-people-needing-to-pee-8240131 [https://perma.cc/ 
6EMT-EXNG] (“If my little girl is in a public women’s restroom and a man, regardless of 
how he may identify, goes into the bathroom, he will then identify as a John Doe until he 
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These are just some of the emerging examples demonstrating how, even in 
the absence of enforcement by local law enforcement, bathroom bills can 
encourage private enforcement.  Some bathroom bills, like those in 
Florida,181 Kansas,182 and Oklahoma,183 explicitly authorize private 
individuals to engage in enforcement by granting civil rights of action.  But 
even those that do not empower individuals in such a formal way may 
nevertheless contribute to vigilantism.  In sociological terms, these measures 
contribute to a sense of moral panic by ostracizing trans individuals as “folk 
devils.”184 
III.  CHALLENGING BATHROOM LAWS AS STATUS CRIMES 
Once we understand many of the proposed bathroom laws as either directly 
or indirectly criminalizing bathroom use by trans individuals, we can turn to 
the question of whether such statutes criminalize the status of being trans.  In 
1962, in Robinson v. California,185 the Supreme Court declared the 
criminalization of a status to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause.186  Six years later, in Powell v. Texas,187 a 
split Court limited the Robinson doctrine to the proposition that states can 
criminalize voluntary conduct—even conduct linked to a status.188  In the 
years that followed, the Court has resisted efforts to further clarify the 
doctrine set out in Robinson and Powell.  This left the lingering question 
whether states may criminalize conduct that is so entwined with a status as 
to be inseparable and so constitutionally indistinguishable.189 
Thus, this Part argues that the Court’s decisions in Robinson and Powell 
bar the criminalization of conduct that is integral to the existence of 
defendants and, as such, is tantamount to criminalization of their status.  Put 
another way, to criminally regulate necessary biological functions is to 
 
 181. See H.R. 583, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015). 
 182. See H.R. 2737, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2016). 
 183. See S. 1619, 55th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2016). 
 184. See generally STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS (1972).  This 
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solutions . . . . 
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Panic, 4 CRIME MEDIA & CULTURE 9, 12 (2008).  Folk devils are often the focus of these moral 
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powerfully precisely because it relates to personal fears and unconscious wishes.” Id. at 15.   
 185. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 186. See id. at 677.  
 187. 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
 188. See id. at 535. 
 189. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated 
as moot, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the enforcement of anticamping 
ordinances against the homeless could qualify as an Eighth Amendment violation when there 
is no alternative shelter space available). 
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criminalize existence.  Just as the Court in Robinson found a California 
statute criminalizing drug addiction to be constitutionally objectionable 
because it criminalized the defendant’s mere existence (as opposed to his 
actions), laws that criminally regulate bathroom use unconstitutionally 
criminalize the existence of trans individuals. 
On the most basic level, the act of going to the bathroom is “universal and 
unavoidable.”190  It is both “necessary for human survival”191 and 
“innocent.”192  Several of the proposed statutes offer trans individuals no 
means to safely use a public bathroom.  Use of a bathroom consistent with 
their gender identity becomes a crime193 and use of a bathroom consistent 
with their “biological sex”194 creates a risk of private violence.  This risk is 
particularly high in cases where a trans individual’s outward appearance is 
more traditionally consistent with their gender identity than their sex assigned 
at birth. 
This Part considers the history of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with 
regard to status crimes.  It then evaluates the divergent perspectives taken by 
appellate courts in distinguishing between statuses and acts.  Finally, it draws 
on the language of the Ninth Circuit in Jones v. City of Los Angeles195 to 
argue that the criminalization of trans bathroom use may qualify as a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.196 
A.  Status Crimes 
Any first year law student can attest that, as a general principle, conviction 
requires proof of an act or, in rare cases, an omission.197  In 1962, the 
Supreme Court in Robinson considered a California statute that made it 
unlawful for a person to “be addicted to the use of narcotics.”198  The Court 
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 191. Statement of Interest of the United States at 12, Bell v. City of Boise, 993 F. Supp. 2d 
1237 (D. Idaho 2014) (No. 1:09-cv-00540-REB).  
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 193. See supra notes 7–29. 
 194. See Assemb. 375, 78th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015). 
 195. 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated after settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 196. Id. at 1138. 
 197. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 87 (6th ed. 2012) (noting the 
requirement of an act, or occasionally an omission, in defining criminal liability). 
 198. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 (1962). The statute in question stated: 
No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of 
narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of a person 
licensed by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics.  It shall be the burden of 
the defense to show that it comes within the exception.  Any person convicted of 
violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be 
sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the 
county jail.  The court may place a person convicted hereunder on probation for a 
period not to exceed five years and shall in all cases in which probation in granted 
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least 90 days.  In no event does the court have the power to absolve a person who 
violates this section from the obligation of spending at least 90 days in confinement 
in the county jail. 
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confirmed that conviction requires proof of an act, concluding that 
criminalization of a status alone not only runs contrary to this long-held 
principle, but also violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment.199 
Acknowledging that California has considerable authority to regulate 
illegal drugs and collateral crime that narcotics may spawn within its borders, 
the Court nonetheless struck down the statute.200  The problem with the 
statute was not that it punished a drug addict but that it punished him because 
he was an addict.201  The Court noted that the statute in question “makes the 
‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender may 
be prosecuted ‘at any time before he reforms.’”202  The status of being a drug 
addict “may be contracted innocently or involuntarily” and would permit the 
state to punish even individuals who have “never touched any narcotic drug 
within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior.”203  The Court 
concluded that punishing a person under such circumstances, even if the 
punishment is relatively mild, constitutes a violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.204 
While the Robinson decision found statutes regulating status alone 
constitutionally wanting, it also hinted at a burgeoning debate.205  First, the 
Robinson Court seemed to draw a line between status—even statuses that 
might be socially harmful such as narcotic addiction—and criminal law.206  
Robinson acknowledged that the state could regulate narcotic addiction and 
the social problems stemming from addiction in such civil realms as 
healthcare, education, or social welfare, but it could not criminalize being an 
addict.207  This border between crime and status, however, was limited.  A 
state could not criminalize the status of an addict, but California was free to 
criminally regulate the manufacturing, distribution, or possession of 
narcotics—even if this regulation affected addicts disproportionately or was 
 
Id. at 660 n.1 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1972) (repealed 1972)).  
 199. Id. at 666–68. 
 200. Id. at 667–68.  To bolster this claim, the Court cited Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 
41 (1921), in which the Court clearly stated that states maintain the authority to exercise police 
power in regulating the sale, prescription, and use of dangerous drugs.  
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 664.  
 201. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. at 666 n.3. 
 204. See id. at 666.  The Court in Robinson also brings up other examples of possible 
statuses that a state would not be permitted to punish, including mental illness and venereal 
disease.  This Article does not mean to suggest that the “status” of being trans is, in any way, 
comparable to a disease or illness.  
 205. Id. at 665–66. 
 206. See id.  
 207. See id. at 666.  Ironically, perhaps, some of these nonpunitive measures might result 
in involuntary commitment to a treatment or mental health facility.  This suggests that the 
Court’s true constitutional concern with the California statute was not that it regulated 
addiction or the behavior associated with it or that it produced a period of confinement based 
on that regulation but that it punished Robinson for being an addict. 
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the product of their addiction.208  These twin components of the Robinson 
holding foreshadowed the debate to come. 
Six years after Robinson, in Powell v. Texas,209 the Court revisited these 
questions.  Powell had been convicted of public intoxication in violation of a 
Texas statute.210  At trial, Powell had claimed that “his appearance in public 
[while drunk was] . . . not of his own volition” but was a product of chronic 
alcoholism.211  In support of his position at trial, Powell introduced the 
testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. David Wade, who characterized Powell as “a 
‘chronic alcoholic,’ who ‘by the time he has reached [the state of 
intoxication] . . . is not able to control his behavior, and [who] . . . has reached 
this point because he has an uncontrollable compulsion to drink.’”212  As 
such, like other alcoholics, Powell was an “‘involuntary drinker,’ who [was] 
‘powerless not to drink,’ and who ‘loses his self-control over his 
drinking.’”213  Even in conceding that Powell’s decision to take a first drink 
when sober was a “voluntary exercise of his will,” Dr. Wade added that 
“these individuals have a compulsion, and this compulsion, while not 
completely overpowering, is a very strong influence, an exceedingly strong 
influence.”214  Powell himself testified to a long history of alcohol abuse and 
public intoxication.215  The trial court was unimpressed and disallowed 
Powell’s defense of chronic alcoholism.216  Nonetheless, the court entered a 
defense-requested finding of fact that chronic alcoholism was a disease that 
destroyed the afflicted person’s free will, including his will to avoid public 
intoxication and that Powell was in fact a chronic alcoholic.217 
Based on these findings, Powell argued on appeal that he did “not appear 
in public by his own volition,” but rather “under a compulsion symptomatic 
of the disease of chronic alcoholism.”218  As such, Powell argued, Texas’s 
regulation of his public intoxication was in fact a regulation of his illness or 
status as an alcoholic.219  While Texas was free to regulate the social woes 
associated with alcoholism, under the Robinson decision it was not free to 
criminalize Powell’s condition.220 
 
 208. See id. at 664. 
 209. 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion). 
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A four-member plurality of the Court rejected this argument, 
characterizing it and the findings of fact upon which it was based as a 
transparent attempt to bring Powell within the Court’s language in 
Robinson.221  In distinguishing the two cases, the plurality first questioned 
whether alcoholism was in fact a “status” (or more accurately, in the words 
of the Court, a disease or a mere symptom of other diseases).222  Beyond this, 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the plurality, noted that Texas was 
punishing Powell for his conduct of appearing drunk in public, rather than 
for the dubious status of being an alcoholic.223  Justice Marshall wrote that 
“[t]he entire thrust of Robinson’s interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the 
accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which 
society has an interest in preventing . . . .”224  In Powell, the Court seemed to 
jettison Robinson’s premise that social ills can and should be dealt with in 
the civil realm.  Instead, the plurality promoted the notion that states may 
criminalize actions that are the “product” of a status that the state seeks to 
control.225 
Powell may have been based in part on the plurality’s unwillingness to 
recognize that alcoholism was in fact a status even though the Court in 
Robinson had recognized narcotic addiction as a status or illness.  The Powell 
plurality noted that there was no general agreement among the medical 
community about whether alcoholism constitutes a disease.226  There was 
also disagreement about whether alcoholism truly strips a person of his or her 
ability to control the amount of alcohol consumed.227  As the plurality 
reasoned:   
It is one thing to say that if a man is deprived of alcohol his hands will begin 
to shake, he will suffer agonizing pains and ultimately he will have 
hallucinations; it is quite another to say that a man has a “compulsion” to 
drink, but that he also retains a certain amount of “free will” with which to 
resist.228 
Turning to the question of what precisely Texas sought to regulate, the 
plurality contrasted the facts in Powell with the facts in Robinson.  Unlike in 
Robinson, the State of Texas was not punishing Mr. Powell for being a 
chronic alcoholic.229  Rather, Texas was punishing him for the act of being 
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 229. See id. at 532. 
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in public while drunk.230  This distinction, though seemingly minute, was 
constitutionally significant.  The plurality reasoned that Texas sought to 
regulate Powell’s behavior as opposed to his status.231  This act—being 
intoxicated in public—could create a serious health and safety hazard both 
for Mr. Powell and for the public.232  Accordingly, the state had the power to 
criminalize it, even if the statute disproportionately affected those less 
capable of regulating such behavior themselves.233  In reaching this 
conclusion, the plurality rejected Powell’s claim that Robinson stood for the 
broader proposition that “criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a 
person for being in a condition he is powerless to change.”234  The plurality 
worried that to adopt such a broad position would render the Supreme Court 
“under the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the ultimate 
arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibility.”235  If the Eighth 
Amendment could bar prosecution of an alcoholic for being drunk in public, 
could it bar prosecution of an addict for possessing drugs or committing a 
theft to buy drugs?  Would the broad reading Mr. Powell urged bar the 
prosecution for murder of someone with an “exceedingly strong” impulse to 
kill?236 
The plurality even compared Mr. Powell’s argument to an attempt to craft 
a sort of “insanity test” under the Eighth Amendment.237  The opinion stated: 
If a person in the “condition” of being a chronic alcoholic cannot be 
criminally punished as a constitutional matter for being drunk in public, it 
would seem to follow that a person who contends that . . . “his unlawful act 
was the product of mental disease or mental defect,” [under the so-called 
Durham test for legal insanity] would state an issue of constitutional 
dimension with regard to his criminal responsibility had he been tried under 
some different and perhaps lesser standard . . . .238 
In other words, the plurality found it difficult to distinguish between Mr. 
Powell’s proposed extension of Robinson and an effective 
constitutionalization of the Durham test for legal insanity.239  Given this 
ambiguity, these Justices opted against taking a step that would hamper state 
autonomy to define and limit criminal responsibility.240  Ultimately, the 
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plurality opinion appeared to strictly differentiate status and conduct.241  
Even under the most generous interpretation, Mr. Powell’s public 
intoxication was classified as conduct rather than as a status—and so the State 
of Texas was well within its rights under the Eighth Amendment to punish 
Mr. Powell. 
The dissenting Justices argued for an expansion of the Eighth Amendment 
to protect against the criminalization of conduct that an individual is 
powerless to avoid.242  To these four Justices, the Constitution prohibited 
states from punishing a person for conduct that was “a characteristic part of 
the pattern of [a] disease [that is] not the consequence of [his] volition.”243 
In the end, faced with a four-Justice plurality and a four-Justice dissent, 
the separate concurrence of the ninth member of the Court set the boundaries 
of the holding.244  Justice Byron White, concurring in the result, rejected the 
distinction between status and conduct, instead focusing on the voluntariness 
of Mr. Powell’s conduct.245  He wrote: 
If it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics, I 
do not see how it can constitutionally be a crime to yield to such a 
compulsion.  Punishing an addict for using drugs convicts for addiction 
under a different name.  Distinguishing between the two crimes is like 
forbidding criminal conviction for being sick with flu or epilepsy but 
permitting punishment for running a fever or having a convulsion.246 
It may very well be the case, Justice White reasoned, that a chronic 
alcoholic could become so drunk in private that he would “lose[] the power 
to control his movements and for that reason appear[] in public.”247  Justice 
White concluded the Eighth Amendment would forbid punishment in such 
circumstances.248  But the record in Powell did not provide enough evidence 
to reach such a conclusion.249  Powell had been convicted not merely of use 
or possession of alcohol but for the separate act of being drunk in public, and 
so Justice White upheld the conviction as constitutionally sound.250 
 
 241. See id. at 234–35.  
 242. See id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting).  
 243. Id. at 558. 
 244. See id. at 548 (White, J., concurring).  
 245. See id. at 548–52 (explaining in part how, for some alcoholics, it may be that 
drunkenness is a symptom of their disease that they could have a hard time avoiding and so it 
is simultaneously conduct and part of status).  
 246. Id. at 548 (citation omitted). 
 247. Id. at 552.  
 248. See id. 
 249. Id. at 552–53.  
 250. See id. (explaining how Powell could have drunk at home and made plans while he 
was sober to prevent ending up in a public place). Justice White also observed a number of 
other potential problems with Mr. Powell’s argument in the record. Id.  The medical testimony 
did not seem to indicate that Mr. Powell was unable to comprehend or control his behavior 
because of his intoxication. Id. at 553–54.  It may have been that Mr. Powell fully understood 
his actions at the time he appeared in public drunk.  Mr. Powell himself testified that he had 
no clear recollection of the situation. Id.  In the record, Mr. Powell had only really shown that 
he was drunk at the time of his arrest and that he was somewhat compelled to drink because 
of his infliction. Id.  What he failed to do is show that he was incapable of staying off the 
streets that night. Id.  
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In its wake, the Powell decision left an uncertain constitutional line around 
the criminalization of status.  At least one commentator concluded that the 
Court in Powell “relegated [Robinson] to the outermost fringe of the criminal 
law by the narrow reading placed upon it.”251  Others are less certain.252  
Between the plurality opinion, the dissent, and Justice White’s concurrence, 
it is difficult to delineate a definitive rule from Powell.  To be certain, Powell 
does not appear to overrule Robinson.253  It does appear, however, to 
significantly narrow the Robinson doctrine.  Taken together, the two cases 
seem to confirm the constitutional requirement that criminal laws must 
regulate some conduct by the defendant, with Justice White requiring that 
such conduct be voluntary.254  But the legacies of Powell and Robinson are 
more complex.  Just as Robinson prohibited criminalization of status, the 
dissent and White’s concurrence in Powell would seem to suggest that some 
conduct is so linked to status itself that it may not be constitutionally 
criminalized.  To paraphrase Justice White, it is the fever to the crime of flu.  
This recognition of conduct entwined with status pushes against the 
plurality’s concern in Powell that overextension of the Robinson status 
doctrine could eviscerate the notion of criminal responsibility.  As lower 
courts have struggled to disentangle questions of conduct and status, the 
complexity of this debate is ever apparent. 
B.  Extending Status Crimes to Inextricably Linked Conduct 
The story of status crimes in the years following the decisions in Robinson 
and Powell has been largely one-sided as courts have increasingly declined 
to find statutes regulating conduct unconstitutional, even when the regulated 
conduct is closely linked to status.255  The use of the Robinson doctrine has 
been so limited that some scholars lament the lost opportunity to expand the 
constitutional limitations on criminal punishment.256  Others, however, have 
 
 251. Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 1269, 1270 (1998). 
 252. See, e.g., Sarah Gerry, Jones v. City of Los Angeles:  A Moral Response to One City’s 
Attempt to Criminalize, Rather Than Confront, Its Homelessness Crisis, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 239, 245 (2007). 
 253. See DRESSLER, supra note 197, at 99. 
 254. See Kent Greenawalt, “Uncontrollable” Actions and the Eighth Amendment:  
Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 931 (1969) (“[T]he dissent comes 
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 255. See, e.g., Joyce v. City & County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 845–46 (N.D. 
Cal. 1994) (declining to find an Eighth Amendment violation for targeted enforcement of laws, 
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191 A.2d 43, 44–45 (N.J. 1963) (per curiam) (upholding New Jersey statute criminalizing use 
of narcotics as distinct from criminalizing the status of narcotic addict). 
 256. See, e.g., Bilionis, supra note 251, at 1270 (“[W]hat followed from Lambert and 
Robinson, the received wisdom holds, is a story of unfulfilled potential, the unexciting tale of 
an exciting substantive constitutional criminal law that never came to be.”); Richard S. Frase, 
The Warren Court’s Missed Opportunities in Substantive Criminal Law, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 75, 78–79 (2005) (concluding that, after Powell, the Robinson doctrine appeared merely to 
stand for the proposition that states cannot punish “pure status or propensity” and that it does 
not appear to impose “a constitutionalized ‘voluntary act’ standard”). 
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argued that extending Robinson could pose a “radical threat to traditional 
criminal law doctrine” so serious that it could “threaten[] the continued 
existence of the criminal law itself” by eviscerating traditional notions of 
responsibility.257  Given the lack of a clear holding in Powell, lower courts 
have used different tests when examining whether a statute constitutes the 
criminalization of status in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  In large part, 
they have concluded that state regulations—even those that appear linked to 
status itself—are permissible under the Eighth Amendment so long as they 
restrict conduct as opposed to status.258 
Efforts to draw a strict dichotomy between the criminalization of status 
and the criminalization of voluntary conduct have focused on the language 
of the Powell plurality.  For example, in Lehr v. City of Sacramento,259 a 
group of eleven homeless persons and three nonprofit charities brought a civil 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Sacramento and the police 
in the hope of enjoining the enforcement of the city’s ordinance barring 
camping within city limits.260  As the plaintiff’s expert testified at trial, the 
majority of the homeless individuals in Sacramento “have neither a legal 
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Protest Against the Unconstitutional Punishment of Pregnant Drug-Addicted Women, 9 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 781, 783 (2006) (same); Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity:  A 
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Edward J. Walters, No Way Out:  Eighth Amendment Protection for Do-or-Die Acts of the 
Homeless, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1619, 1632–33 (1995) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment after 
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Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 84 YALE L.J. 413, 443–44 (1975) (arguing that actions 
taken by addicts are not involuntary). 
 258. See infra notes 269–75 and accompanying text. 
 259. 624 F. Supp. 2d. 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2009).  
 260. See id. at 1219–20. 
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place to go nor sufficient resources to obtain one.”261  Homelessness, the 
expert contended, is due to factors outside of the individuals’ control, like 
poverty, social isolation, and disability.262  Evidence also suggested that 
Sacramento was unable to provide accommodations for homeless people, 
leaving approximately 1200 persons on the street nightly without access to 
shelters.263  Therefore, the plaintiffs in Lehr alleged that the city’s 
enforcement of the anticamping law constituted a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment as it effectively criminalized the status of being homeless by 
expressly criminalizing an involuntary act by potential defendants—sleeping 
in the only location available to them.264 
In rejecting this argument, the Lehr court relied primarily on the plurality 
opinion in Powell.265  While the city was able to establish that homelessness 
constituted a serious problem, the court held that “this does not give us 
license to expand the narrow limits that, in a ‘rare type of case,’ the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment places on substantive 
criminal law.”266  Echoing some legal commentators, the court in Lehr also 
emphasized that any ruling preventing Sacramento from enforcing such an 
anticamping law under the Eighth Amendment would have “extraordinary” 
ramifications for the criminal law more broadly.267  “A decision in Plaintiff’s 
favor,” the court warned, “would set precedent for an onslaught of challenges 
to criminal convictions by those who seek to rely on the involuntariness of 
their actions.”268 
Similarly, courts have opted not to extend the Robinson doctrine to drug 
possession offenses,269 possession with intent to distribute drugs,270 child 
pornography distribution,271 and illegal reentry into the United States after 
deportation.272  In each case, the courts not only noted that the statutes in 
question regulated conduct as opposed to status, but they also rejected the 
notion that such conduct was beyond the defendant’s control or constituted a 
necessity of life itself. 
 
 261. Id. at 1222.  
 262. See id.   
 263. See id.  The City of Sacramento housed approximately 1500 individuals at emergency 
shelters but the number of beds provided was simply inadequate for the number of individuals 
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 264. See id. at 1224–27.  
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relying on the plurality as “sound logic”).  
 266. Id. at 1231 (quoting Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 
2006) (Rymer, J. dissenting), vacated after settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 267. Id. at 1232.  
 268. Id. at 1234.  
 269. See, e.g., United States v. Ritter, 752 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the logic from Robinson does not 
prevent the state from punishing possession of narcotics by a drug addict). 
 270. See, e.g., United States v. Kidder, 869 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 271. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 116 F.3d 198, 201 (7th Cir. 1997) (declining to 
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 272. See, e.g., United States v. Ayala, 35 F.3d 423, 425–26 (9th Cir. 1994).  
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By contrast, other courts have interpreted the Powell and Robinson line of 
cases to provide a more significant Eighth Amendment limitation on 
criminalization.273  These courts have held that states cannot constitutionally 
punish conduct that is so inextricably linked to one’s status as to render its 
regulation indistinguishable from the punishment of status itself.  These 
courts have examined the criminalized conduct in relation to the status 
claimed.  The most prominent of these cases is Jones v. City of Los 
Angeles.274  Similar to the Lehr case, the plaintiffs in Jones were a group of 
homeless individuals seeking to enjoin a Los Angeles ordinance that 
criminalized actions like sitting, lying, or sleeping on public sidewalks.275  
As expected, the Jones court began its Eighth Amendment analysis by 
discussing Robinson and Powell.276  After walking through the history of 
these cases, the Jones court ultimately concluded that “five Justices in Powell 
understood Robinson to stand for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the state from punishing an involuntary act or condition if it is the 
unavoidable consequence of one’s status or being.”277  The court also 
concluded that the articulation of this understanding by the Powell dissenters 
and Justice White in his concurrence was not mere dicta but rather was a 
point of agreement that had garnered the requisite five votes to be binding.278 
In applying this interpretation of Powell and Robinson to the facts at hand, 
Jones made two important findings.  First, the court observed the 
fundamental unfairness of penalizing individuals for engaging in conduct that 
is necessary to sustain life.279  The acts that the Los Angeles ordinance 
criminalized—sitting, lying, and sleeping—are “unavoidable consequences 
of being human.”280  A person is “biologically compelled” to engage in this 
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 279. See id. at 1136. 
 280. Id. (“It is undisputed that, for homeless individuals in Skid Row who have no access 
to private spaces, these acts can only be done in public.”).  Soon after this quote, the majority 
admonishes the dissenters for suggesting that a homeless person could simply avoid sleeping, 
lying, or sitting in public:  “The City and the dissent apparently believe that Appellants can 
avoid sitting, lying, and sleeping for days, weeks, or months at a time to comply with the City’s 
ordinance, as if human beings could remain in perpetual motion.” Id. 
2017] BATHROOM LAWS AS STATUS CRIMES 39 
conduct.281  It would be unreasonable to expect individuals not to engage in 
otherwise innocent and necessary conduct. 
Second, and relatedly, the court held that the life-sustaining conduct 
criminalized under certain circumstances in the Los Angeles ordinance was 
inextricably linked to the status of being homeless.282  Even if Los Angeles 
sought to criminalize “acts” and not status, given the lack of available 
housing, homeless individuals had no real voluntary choice—they must 
either break the law or cease to exist.  Their bodies required sleep, and 
alternative accommodations were not available.283  To survive, the homeless 
of Los Angeles would eventually be compelled to break the law.284  Thus, 
the court concluded that the Los Angeles statute amounted to “criminalizing 
Appellants’ status as homeless individuals.”285 
In the context of bathroom laws, it is also worth noting that the judges in 
Jones included language about the meaning of status under the Eighth 
Amendment.  The Ninth Circuit noted that “[h]omelessness is not an innate 
or immutable characteristic, nor is it a disease, such as drug addiction or 
alcoholism.”286  Individuals may escape homelessness only to become 
homeless again in the future.287  Nonetheless, the court held that a statute 
need not criminalize an immutable characteristic to run afoul of the Eighth 
Amendment.288  It need only create a situation where an individual, because 
of her current condition, must choose between existence and lawfulness. 
The Jones court’s recognition of acts linked to status is not unique.  In 
other contexts, at least one Supreme Court Justice previously flirted with the 
idea that acts “so closely linked” to the status of being LGBTQ may be 
protected under the Robinson doctrine.289  Subsequently, at least one court 
has relied on the Robinson doctrine in suggesting that states cannot 
criminalize the status of being gay or lesbian.290 
Likewise, Jones’s acknowledgment that the criminalization of transient 
status may offend the Eighth Amendment is not unique.  For juvenile 
offenders, the Supreme Court has held that offenses such as truancy, curfew 
violation, or unruliness that depend on the offender’s status as a minor must 
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 290. See, e.g., Cyr v. Walls, 439 F. Supp. 697, 701–02 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (“[A] statute 
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be treated differently than other criminal (or in the terms of juvenile court, 
delinquency) offenses.291  While this distinction is premised on the notion 
that the conduct in question is inseparably tied to the defendant’s status as a 
child—youth is in fact an element of the offenses in question—in many ways 
it is a distinction that serves to deny greater protections, because children 
adjudged to have committed status offenses may be held without a due 
process precommitment hearing.292  Even so, the Court has recognized that, 
in limited cases, even a transient status such as youth requires shelter from 
criminalization under the Eighth Amendment. 
In other contexts, however, states have been left free to criminalize 
behavior that is dependent on youthful status.  So called “juvenile status” 
offenses, such as “minor in possession of alcohol” or “minor in possession of 
a firearm,” survive constitutional muster despite the fact that the act of the 
defendant is criminal only because of her status as a minor.293 
The story of status offenses is a mixed and often neglected history with 
courts struggling to define the precise parameters and protections of the 
Eighth Amendment as set forth in Powell and Robinson.  Despite this 
muddled history, there is at least some willingness to recognize that 
criminalization of conduct so closely linked to status may support Eighth 
Amendment challenges under Robinson and Powell.  Admittedly, the 
category of conduct that is inextricably linked to status is narrow.  Courts 
seem inclined to rely on this doctrine only in rare cases.  But as explained in 
the next subpart, the context of bathroom laws may be one of the few 
circumstances that warrant the extension of this doctrine to a new category 
of criminal statutes. 
C.  Applying Robinson to Bathroom Laws 
This Article contends that, should states pass laws that attempt to 
criminalize the use of bathrooms by trans individuals consistent with their 
gender identities (either as a stand-alone crime or a violation of existing 
statutes), such a law could constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment.  
Read together, the Court’s decisions in Robinson and Powell seem to suggest 
that while states may criminally regulate conduct linked to status, they may 
not criminally regulate conduct that is so entwined with the defendant’s 
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existence as to have the effect of criminalizing her or his status.  To be sure, 
the category of conduct so tightly linked to existence is small, but given the 
biological imperative of bathroom use, regulation of such use based on trans 
status would appear to effectively criminalize the “status” of being trans.294  
Given the serious consequences of criminalization—both in terms of official 
and vigilante enforcement—this recognition of bathroom regulation as status 
regulation would offer private civil rights advocates a narrow avenue through 
which to challenge the constitutionality of certain categories of bathroom 
laws. 
The argument proceeds as follows:  First, using a bathroom is a necessary 
biological function without which human existence fails.295  Second, existing 
laws prohibit the public exercise of this function outside designated 
spaces.296  Third, as a result of their status as living human beings, trans 
individuals have no genuine, voluntary choice when in public but to use 
public bathroom facilities when needing to exercise biological functions.  
Fourth, bathroom regulations that prohibit a trans person from using a 
bathroom facility consistent with their gender identity create a Hobson’s 
choice for trans individuals.  If they obey the law and use a bathroom 
consistent with their “biological sex” as assigned at birth, they put themselves 
in serious risk of humiliation, embarrassment, and physical violence—
particularly if their outward physical appearance is more in line with their 
gender identity.  If they use the bathroom facility consistent with their gender 
identity, they violate the law.  In short, because such laws are targeted 
specifically at trans individuals, and they criminalize conduct linked to 
existence, they criminalize the very existence of such individuals. 
Even if one adopts the position of the Powell concurrence that states may 
seek to regulate conduct linked to a status that produces social harm, there is 
no evidence that bathroom use by trans individuals actually produces such 
harm.  Despite the loud and hyperbolic claims to the contrary,297 experts have 
widely discredited the argument that the use of bathrooms by trans 
individuals consistent with their gender identities poses any safety risk.298  
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Thus, bathroom laws are generally distinguishable from the overwhelming 
majority of criminal statutes in that they punish conduct that, for all practical 
purposes, is harmless.  In other criminal law contexts, the Supreme Court has 
barred states from criminalizing harmless conduct.299 
As seductively compact and efficient as the argument above may appear, 
there is more at play than the mere regulation of where an individual may 
perform particular biological functions.  Bathroom regulations for trans 
individuals, like the criminal regulation of addicts and the homeless, seek to 
draw boundaries around spaces of existence. 
Proponents of the bathroom bills decry the potential risk to women and 
children posed by trans individuals using bathroom facilities consistent with 
their gender identities.300  These same proponents argue that they do not seek 
to ban trans bathroom use altogether—rather, private bathrooms exist that 
trans individuals may use just as there are private spaces in which trans 
individuals can exist.301  They argue that bathroom regulations are less about 
criminalizing the status of being trans and more about criminalizing the 
conduct of bathroom use and the social harm that may flow from that use.302 
That argument is tenuous at best and destructive at worst.  At its core, the 
argument seeks to preclude the physical presence of trans individuals in 
public settings by regulating their bodily functions.  It seeks to carve out only 
the narrowest spaces in which trans individuals can live and function as 
citizens and people.  It seeks to exclude them from the public spaces that 
people share in a communal recognition of what it is to be a human being.  In 
the process, it seeks to relegate the status of being trans to the status of being 
other, foreign, and subject to regulation.  Ultimately, this argument leads to 
exclusion, criminalization, and concealment. 
In sum, bathroom bills that propose the criminalization of trans bathroom 
use may run afoul of the Eighth Amendment by criminalizing seemingly 
involuntary, harmless, and life-sustaining conduct inextricably linked to the 
status of being trans.  While courts have been reluctant to extend the 
Robinson and Powell doctrine to many criminal law contexts, bathroom bills 
present a unique situation—one in which the majority has targeted a criminal 
prohibition at generally innocent conduct only in cases where it is inevitably 
committed by a disadvantaged minority.  In the larger scheme, though, such 
bathroom bills signal the further marginalization of the trans population.  
While the Constitution may not explicitly recognize a right of human dignity, 
such recognition seems implicit in the Court’s prohibition of the 
criminalization of status.  However limited the Robinson holding may be after 
Powell, at a minimum it stands for the notion that criminal law cannot and 
should not outlaw people. 
 
 299. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (striking down a Texas 
statute that prohibited consensual sexual activity between adults). 
 300. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 301. See generally Wilson, supra note 86. 
 302. See generally id. 
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D.  Possible Objections 
Critics may have many legitimate reasons for concern about this Article’s 
proposal to treat bathroom laws as status regulations.  This section seeks to 
recognize and address such objections.  First, and most obviously, such 
statutes arguably regulate conduct as opposed to status per se.  As such, they 
could survive a constitutional challenge under Powell.  Such a 
characterization, however, overlooks both the involuntary nature of the 
conduct regulated and the cobbled holding of Powell.  The need to use the 
bathroom, including at times public bathrooms, is a necessary biological 
function arguably no more avoidable than breathing in public.  It is innocent 
conduct criminalized only because of status—that of being a trans individual. 
Second, some may argue that being trans does not comport with the more 
traditional understanding of status under the Eighth Amendment.  To bolster 
this argument, critics may contend that trans individuals ultimately make a 
choice to identify as a gender different from their so-called “biological sex” 
assigned at birth.  Under this rationale, critics may argue that trans individuals 
are not barred from using public bathrooms under many proposed bathroom 
laws.  They are merely required to use a bathroom consistent with their 
“biological sex.”  If trans individuals are worried about the possibility of 
humiliation, violence, or other backlash, they could simply abstain from 
using public, sex-segregated bathroom facilities. 
The notion of trans status as “transitory” is hardly new to the Eighth 
Amendment debate on the criminalization of status.  The dissent in Jones 
argued that being homeless was not the kind of status typically protected from 
criminalization under the Eighth Amendment, as it can be a “transitory state” 
that “can change.”303  Likewise, the Powell plurality questioned the 
sufficiency of the permanence of alcoholism to establish it as a status.304 
In the context of trans status, however, the primary argument of the 
transitory nature of trans identity misunderstands the lived experience of a 
trans person and the nature of status crime prohibitions under the Eighth 
Amendment.  For one thing, while the decision to live consistently with one’s 
gender identity may technically represent a choice of sorts, emerging 
scientific evidence calls into question whether the status of being trans is in 
fact a choice or a biological phenomenon.305  Beyond this, the fact that the 
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status may be transitory does not preclude it from Eighth Amendment 
protection. 
The Court in Parham v. J.R.306 noted the inherently temporary nature of 
youth.307  The Jones court acknowledged that homelessness might not be 
constant.308  Each court confronted with an admittedly transitory status 
nonetheless found Eighth Amendment fault in criminalization of that status.  
In each opinion, the constitutional offense arises from the criminalization of 
the status itself as opposed to the permanence of the status.  Neither Powell 
nor Robinson suggests that courts must view the concept of status so 
narrowly. 
Next, critics may claim that even if faced with a choice between 
criminalization or humiliation (or worse) when using public bathrooms, trans 
individuals can make a choice to use either private, single-occupancy, or 
gender-neutral bathrooms.  This critique suffers practical flaws, however.  It 
is premised on the notion that trans individuals have access to such facilities 
at the moment of need.309  As nearly any traveler can attest, the need for a 
bathroom and the presence of a bathroom do not always neatly align.  
Likewise, not all public buildings or accommodations offer single-occupancy 
bathrooms.310  A careful examination of the bathroom laws proposed during 
the last four years reveals that virtually none of them require public buildings 
to provide trans persons with such an accommodation. 
Critics may also contend that criminal law defenses of justification or 
necessity are available to trans populations charged with violation of 
bathroom regulations or other criminal statutes, and, as such, no 
constitutional claim is necessary.  In Powell, Justice Marshall noted that 
“[t]he doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and 
duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting 
adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of criminal law and 
changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of 
man.”311  Indeed, such defenses—particularly justification or necessity—
may provide some shelter for trans individuals arrested and charged for 
violating a bathroom statute.  A justification defense permits a necessary and 
proportional response to triggering conditions.312  Likewise, a necessity 
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defense allows noncompliance with the law if the harm resulting from 
compliance is greater than that resulting from violation.313 
Each of these defenses are available to trans individuals confronted with 
the choice of risking harm or arrest when performing the necessary life 
function of using a bathroom in public.  The availability of such defenses, 
however, does not undo or solve the constitutional deficiency that arises from 
the criminalization of trans status.  Nor does the availability of the defense 
offer shelter from the humiliation and personal costs associated with arrest, 
trial, or the possibility of conviction if the fact finder concludes that the 
defense is unpersuasive. 
Finally, critics may contend that interpreting the criminalizing effect of 
bathroom bills as a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s bar on status crimes 
will open the door for challenges to a wide range of other criminal statutes.  
This is the same fundamental argument made by the plurality in Powell and 
the court in Lehr.  Such a fear, however, seems unfounded. 
There is little reason to believe that an extension of the Robinson doctrine 
to this context would lead to any sort of slippery slope.  Bathroom laws 
present a unique situation of a state outlawing conduct—the use of bathroom 
facilities consistent with a person’s gender identity—only when committed 
by trans individuals.  This conduct is, for all practical purposes, necessary 
and life sustaining. This raises concerns about the voluntariness of the 
conduct criminalized by proposed bathroom laws and also suggests that the 
category of conduct that the state criminalizes under bathroom laws is 
decidedly narrow.  It is conceivable that a court could find that the unique 
character of bathroom laws runs afoul of Robinson by effectively outlawing 
involuntary conduct that is inextricably linked to the status of being trans 
without putting other criminal statutes at risk. 
Both Robinson and Powell recognized that there would be times when 
constitutional protection is required to prevent the criminalization of status.  
The reluctance to find the need for such protection in Powell seemed to stem 
from the lack of evidence on the voluntary nature of the conduct in question 
and its link to the status alleged rather than a belief that status cannot or 
should not be protected from criminalization. 
CONCLUSION 
It does not appear that bathroom bills are going away.  The Trump 
administration has already removed the federal guidance that protected the 
ability of trans children to use the bathroom facilities consistent with their 
gender identity in public schools.  In the absence of such executive leadership 
on this issue, there is a greater need than ever for civil rights advocates to 
help turn the tide.  As more states and localities consider bathroom laws, 
researchers must be prepared to evaluate the long-term implications of these 
measures in a way that could sway state legislatures.  The academic 
community must be prepared to evaluate the most audacious claims made by 
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supporters of these laws.  Advocates must be armed with concrete data on the 
likely costs and consequences of bathroom legislation. 
Should these measures become law in some states, scholars must be ready 
to offer concrete, empirical evidence about the implications of these 
measures.  Future research could empirically evaluate the preparedness of 
police to enforce such bathroom laws or qualitatively assess the impact of 
these measures on the well-being of the trans community. 
For the time being, though, it is important to recognize that many of these 
bathroom proposals do more than merely stigmatize trans individuals.  These 
measures are not just symbolic.  As discussed in this Article, recent proposals 
would effectively criminalize public bathroom use by trans individuals.  
Criminalization comes with serious consequences.  It exposes the trans 
community to the risk of physical and emotional harm as members of the 
community come into more regular contact with criminal justice actors.  As 
shown in this Article, actors in the criminal justice system appear to be 
unprepared to handle this newfound responsibility.  Criminalization is not 
just bad public policy—it may very well be unconstitutional.  By 
criminalizing otherwise innocent, life-sustaining, and arguably involuntary 
conduct so inextricably linked to the status of being trans, some bathroom 
laws run afoul of the Eighth Amendment.  This may provide advocates with 
a narrow but important avenue through which to challenge the 
constitutionality of certain categories of bathroom laws. 
